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I. HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Judicial activism has become a subject of controversy in India.1 
Recent and past attempts to hinder the power of the courts, as well as 
access to the courts, included indirect methods of disciplining the 
judiciary, such as supersession of the judges2 and transfers of 
inconvenient judges.3 Critics of judicial activism say that the courts 
usurp functions allotted to the other organs of government. On the 
other hand, defenders of judicial activism assert that the courts 
merely perform their legitimate function. According to Mr. Justice A. 
H. Ahmadi, the former Chief Justice of India, judicial activism is a 
necessary adjunct of the judicial function because the protection of 
public interest, as opposed to private interest, is the main concern.4  
Courts cannot interpret a statute, much less a constitution, in a 
mechanistic manner. In the case of a statute, a court must determine 
the actual intent of the authors. In the case of a constitution, a court 
must sustain the constitution’s relevance to changing social, 
 
 1. S.P. Sat he, Curbson the PIL: Evil Designs of the UF Government, ECON. & POL. 
WKLY ., Vol. XXXII Mar. 1, 1997, at 441. 
 2. JUDICIARY MADE TO MEASURE (N.A. Palkhivala ed., M.R. Pai 1973). 
 3. See India v. Sankalchand, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2328; see generally H.M. SEERVAI, THE 
EMERGENCY , FUTURE SAFEGUARDS AND THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE 119-29 (N.M. Tripathi 
ed., 1978).  
 4. A.M. Ahmadi, Judicial Process: Social Legitimacy and Institutional Viability, 4 
S.C.C. J. v.1, 1-10 (1996). 
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economic, and political scenarios. In the words of Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo, a court must give to the words of a constitution “a 
continuity of life and expression.”5 An apex court, besides deciding 
the law that binds all courts subordinate to it,6 also must make “vocal 
and audible” the ideals that otherwise might remain silent.7 The 
original intentions of the founding fathers do not bind a constitutional 
court. Rather, the court is free to interpret the constitution in terms of 
what the framers would have intended under the circumstances that 
exist at the time of such interpretation. In the absence of such judicial 
activism, a constitution would become stultified and devoid of the 
inner strength necessary to survive and provide normative order for 
the changing times. 
People’s understanding of judicial activism depends on their 
conception of the proper role of a constitutional court in a democracy. 
Those who conceive the role of a constitutional court narrowly, as 
restricted to mere application of the pre-existing legal rules to the 
given situation, tend to equate even a liberal or dynamic 
interpretation of a statute with activism. Those who conceive a wider 
role for a constitutional court, expecting it to both provide meaning to 
various open textured expressions in a written constitution and apply 
new meaning as required by the changing times, usually consider 
judicial activism not as an aberration, but as a normal judicial 
function. 
A. Judicial Process: Nature 
We must first understand the nature of the judicial function in 
general, and of judicial review in particular. Austinian jurisprudence 
gives a very narrow view of the judicial function. Austin defined law 
as a command of the political sovereign with indivisible and absolute 
sovereignty, allowing only the legislature to make law. The function 
of the courts was restricted to declaring the pre-existing law or 
interpreting the statutory law. The English courts created the entire 
common law, but the common law is posited on the myth that the 
 
 5. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 92-94 (1927). 
 6. INDIA CONST. art. 141.  
 7. See, e.g., CARDOZO , supra note 5. 
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judges merely found the law. Despite such a self-negating perception 
of their own role, the English judges not only made the law, but also 
changed it to suit the entirely new conditions created by the industrial 
revolution. Rylands v. Fletcher8 and Donoghue v. Stevenson9 are two 
common law examples of judicial law making. In these cases the 
English courts extended the common law concept of negligence, that 
had essentially evolved in an agricultural society, to meet the needs 
of an emerging industrial society. The judges, however, sustained the 
myth that they did not create any law. 
In England, judicial review of administrative action existed, but 
the courts did not have the power to review the acts of Parliament, 
because Parliament was supreme. Professor Dicey’s theory of 
Parliamentary sovereignty10 represents an English constitutional 
incarnation of Austin’s theory of sovereignty. The low profile of the 
judicial role in England was consistent with the theory of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. However, underneath the self-negation 
lay the creative effort of the courts to protect individual liberty and 
strengthen the rule of law. England has a long history of resistance to 
a written bill of rights because the English people are raised with the 
faith that the liberty of the subject is sacrosanct and the courts will 
allow its infraction only if supported by a provision of law. The 
following celebrated quote from Lord Atkin demonstrates such faith. 
The learned judge said: “In accordance with British jurisprudence no 
member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of 
a British subject except on the condition that he can support the 
legality of his action before a court of justice.”11 
The English people felt quite secure with an omnipotent 
Parliament because they had full faith in the strength of their 
democracy. Over the years, however, even in England, Parliamentary 
sovereignty has eroded considerably in practice as well as in law. For 
example, England has joined the European Convention on Human 
Rights and has accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court on 
 
 8. Rylands v. Fletcher, 1861-73 Eng. Rep. 1 (H.L. 1868). 
 9. Donoghue v. Stevenson, A.C. 562 (1932). 
 10. See, e.g., ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1952). 
 11. Eshugbayi v. Govt. of Nigeria , 1931 A.C. 662 (appeal taken from Nigeria) (1931) All. 
E.R. 44, 49. 
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Human Rights. Further, the English courts have also recently held 
that a European Community law prevails over an act of the British 
Parliament.12 
Judicial review entails scrutiny by the courts of the acts of other 
government organs to ensure that they act within the limits of the 
constitution. Judicial review exists not only in England, but in 
Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, Srilanka, Pakistan 
and Bangla Desh. Judicial review originated in England when the 
courts reviewed the acts of the executive to ensure they were within 
the limits of the statutes enacted by Parliament. The fundamental 
principles of individual liberty emerged from the decisions of the 
courts. The English courts did not hold the acts of Parliament invalid; 
however, in the British colonies, judicial review of legislative acts 
has always been in vogue. Colonial legislatures, unlike the British 
Parliament, were not supreme and their powers were circumscribed 
by the provisions of the constituent acts enacted by the British 
Parliament. The courts in India, therefore, began exercising judicial 
review of legislative acts with the first act of British Parliament in 
1858. In Empress v. Burah and BookBook Singh, the Calcutta High 
Court enunciated the principle of judicial review: 
The theory of every government with a written Constitution 
forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation must 
be that an Act of legislature repugnant to the Constitution is 
void; if void, it cannot bind the courts, and oblige them to give 
effect; for this would be to overthrow in fact what was 
established in theory and make that operative in law which was 
not law. 13 
 When a court interprets a statutory provision it tries to give effect 
to the intention of the legislature. Because the legislature is supposed 
to express itself through the language of the statute, the court adopts 
an interpretation giving effect to the language. Nevertheless, 
language and words are not entirely unambiguous. Words have 
 
 12. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex. parte Facortame, 1991 A.C. 603. See 
Sir William Wade , Sovereignty-Revolution or Evolution?,  112 L.Q. REV. 568 (1996); see also 
John Eekelaar, Note, 113 L.Q. REV. 185, 185-87 (1997). 
 13. Empress v. Burah and Book Singh, I.L.R. 3 (Cal.) 63, 87-88.  
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different meanings and sometimes the concepts behind the statutory 
language require interpretation. This may involve liberal 
interpretation or one of the more plausible methods of interpretation. 
When a judge interprets a constitution, which is an organic law, the 
scope of choice is much wider. A constitution often contains open 
textured and conceptual expressions. A court giving meaning to 
expressions such as “equality before the law and equal protection of 
law,” “freedom of speech and expression,” or “interstate trade and 
commerce” discourses on political philosophy; but, unlike 
philosophers, judges are constrained by the practical limits of the 
need to operationalize their philosophy. Judges participating in 
judicial review of legislative action should be creative and not 
mechanistic in their interpretations. According to Justice Cardozo, a 
written constitution “states or ought to state not rules for the passing 
hour but principles for an expanding future.”14 Judges who interpret a 
written constitution cannot merely apply the law to the facts that 
come before them. The scope of judicial creativity expands when a 
constitution contains a bill of rights. It is one thing to consider 
whether a legislature has acted within its powers and another to 
consider whether its acts, although within its plenary powers, are 
violative of any of the basic rights of the people. Therefore, judges 
who interpret a bill of rights must expound upon the philosophy and 
ideology that underlies the bill of rights. 
When judges interpret the law or a constitution by not merely 
giving effect to the literal meaning of the words, but by trying to 
provide an interpretation consistent with the spirit of that statute or 
constitution, they are said to be activist judges. In this sense, the 
judges who developed the common law were also activist. For 
example, the doctrine of negligence in torts and the doctrine of public 
policy in contracts resulted from judicial activism under the common 
law. Moreover, statutory interpretation often involves choosing one 
interpretation from multiple possible interpretations. This choice of 
interpretations involves the choosing of principles, prioritizing value 
judgments, and also perceiving the correct role of the Judge. 
Liversidge v. Anderson15 illustrates how these factors influence a 
 
 14. CARDOZO , supra note 5, at 83. 
 15. Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C. 206, 3 All. E.R. 338 (H.L. 1941). 
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court’s interpretation. In Liversidge, Regulation XII B of the Defense 
of the Realm Act gave power to the Home Secretary to detain a 
person who was an enemy alien. The regulation provided that if the 
Home Secretary had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was 
of hostile origin, that person could be detained. Lord Atkin, 
dissenting, wrote that the words “reasonable grounds to believe” must 
be interpreted to make the satisfaction of the Home Secretary 
justiciable. The justices on the majority recognized the long-standing 
tradition of construing statutes in favor of the subject, but being 
honestly concerned about the situation created by the War, did not 
want to embarrass the executive while engaged in the prosecution of 
the War. Lord Atkin dissented, stating that they could nevertheless 
uphold the executive action if satisfied that the Home Secretary had 
acted on reasonable grounds. The division of interpretation was 
between the majority justices, who held that their function was to 
construe the statute literally and to equip the executive with the 
power necessary for meeting the challenge of war, and Lord Atkin 
who held that the judicial function included envisioning the long-
term consequences an interpretation would have on individual liberty 
and democracy. Both the majority and the dissenting judges 
considered the political implications of their statutory interpretation. 
The majority justices were concerned about the survival of both 
England as a nation and democracy as a system, which were 
threatened by war. Lord Atkin was no less concerned about those 
issues, but felt that even in such critical times, the court must 
establish that “amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent. They 
may be changed but they speak the same language in war as in 
peace.”16  
Of course, limits to judicial creativity in England exist as well. In 
England, Parliament is supreme, and the courts cannot void a law of 
Parliament. However, in 1610 Lord Coke attempted, in Bonham’s 
case,17 to assert the power to void an act of Parliament if it was 
inconsistent with the common law. Lord Coke failed miserably in his 
attempt to secure such power for the courts, and no judge since has 
 
 16. 3 All E.R. at 361. 
 17. (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 1142; see also  E.C.S. WADE & G. GODFREY PHILIPS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 55, 64 (9th ed. 1978). 
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made such a claim. The courts, therefore, directed their judicial 
activism against the executive and only subtly and indirectly against 
Parliament—without challenging Parliament’s authority to legislate. 
In administrative law, for example, the courts required administrative 
actions after hearing the affected party.18 Courts subjected the 
exercise of administrative discretion to the strictest scrutiny.19 
Therefore, statutory efforts to oust the jurisdiction of the courts were 
frustrated by converting every error of law into an error of 
jurisdiction. 20 These common law methods of dealing with the ouster 
clauses do not hold a legislative act invalid, but rather construe it in a 
way that does not give effect to the legisla ture’s intention to exclude 
the jurisdiction of the courts.21 
Judicial review becomes much more controversial when it 
includes review of legislative acts. While England never had such 
judicial review, it was provided for in the constitutions that England 
made for its former colonies when they attained the status of 
dominions. Both Australia and Canada have judicial review of 
legislation. 
India has had judicial review of legislation since its colonial 
period. The courts, however, observed maximum restraint in dealing 
with the acts of the legislatures. The Privy Council established that 
although the Indian legislature’s powers were circumscribed by the 
restrictions of the constituent act, within its limited sphere it was as 
sovereign as the Imperial Parliament.22 The courts struck down very 
few statutes during the colonial period. Professor Allen Gledhill 
observed that instances of invalidation of laws by courts were so rare 
that “even the Indian lawyer generally regarded the legislature as 
sovereign and it was not until the Government of India Act of 1935 
came into force that avoidance of laws by judicial pronouncement 
 
 18. Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. 40. 
 19. Padfield v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 1968 A.C. 997; [1968] 1 All 
E. R. 694. 
 20. Anismninic Ltd. v. Foreign Comnpensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147, [1969] 1 
All E.R. 208. 
 21. See RAJEEV DHAVAN, THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 63-67 (N.M. Tripathi ed., 
1977). 
 22. Queen v. Burah, [1878] 3 A.C. 889, [1878] 5 I.A. 178; see also  S. P. SATHE, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 33 (6th ed. 1998). 
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was commonly contemplated.”23 However, the courts continued to 
both construe the legislative acts strictly and to apply the English 
common law methods for safeguarding individual liberties. 
B.  Judicial Review in the United States 
Judicial review of legislation became the most significant aspect 
of American constitutional law. Although the Constitution does not 
mention that the Supreme Court has the power to invalidate acts of 
Congress that are contrary to the Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall 
held in Marbury v. Madison24 that such power was implied. This 
assertion of power was criticized severely. The critics argued that it 
amounted to usurpation of power by an unelected court and may 
serve to censor legislation enacted by an elected legislature. 
However, both Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson assumed 
that the Court would have the power to exercise judicial review. 
Hamilton defended the Court’s power: 
[W]here the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, 
stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the 
Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter 
rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions 
by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not 
fundamental. 25 
While speaking on the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution, Jefferson said: 
In the arguments in favour of a declaration of rights, you omit 
one which has great weight with me; the legal check which it 
puts into the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which, if 
rendered independent and kept strictly to their own 
department, merits great confidence for their learning and 
integrity.26 
 
 23. Alan Gledhill, Unconstitutional Legislation , in 9 INDIAN YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 40 (Madras ed., 1952). 
 24. 5 U.S. (1 (Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 25. THE FEDERALIST No.78, at 102 (Alexander Hamilton) (1837). 
 26. SAMUEL EAGLE FORMAN, THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS of THOMAS JEFFERSON 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Although the Supreme Court’s assertion of power of judicial 
review became controversial, its legitimacy and desirability were 
eventually accepted. One writer acknowledged judicial review of 
legislative acts as a “product of American law”27 and another author 
described the United States as the “home of judicial review.”28 
The question of whether the courts should have the power to 
decide issues of policy has always evoked a vehement debate. When 
the Court made a series of objections to President Roosevelt’s 
regulation of the economy in the 1930s, the liberals deemed the Court 
reactionary. When the Warren Court expanded the rights of African 
Americans, the conservatives called the Court adventurist. After the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education,29 the 
conservatives threatened to impeach the Justices, and burnt effigies of 
Chief Justice Warren in protest.  
Such responses result from the disapproval of judicial policies by 
different groups of people. The liberals disapproved of the Court’s 
anti-State intervention policy during the 1930s while the 
conservatives supported that policy. On the other hand, the liberals 
approved of the Warren Court’s concern for freedom of speech and 
religion because they supported desegregation and liberalization of 
the rights of the accused. Various American scholars have, however, 
raised objections to the decisions of the Warren Court on the ground 
that it tended to legislate.30 
C. Judicial Review in India  
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Indian Constitution 
expressly provides for judicial review in Article 13, clause (1), that 
says that all laws that were in force in the territory of India 
immediately before the adoption of the Constitution, in so far as they 
are inconsistent with the provisions containing the fundamental 
 
462 (1900). 
 27. WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY , THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 7 (2d ed. 1929). 
 28. GEOFFREY MARSHALL, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE COMMONWEALTH 
16 (1959). 
 29. 360 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 30. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH  (1962). 
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rights, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. Clause (2) 
of that article further says that the states shall not make any law that 
takes away or abridges any of the fundamental rights, and any law 
made in contravention of the aforementioned mandate shall, to the 
extent of the contravention, be void. The Constitution also divides the 
legislative power between the centre and the states and forbids either 
of them to encroach upon the power of the other. The courts decide 
whether a legislature or an executive has acted in excess of its powers 
or in contradiction to any of the constitutional restrictions on its 
power. Some members of the Constituent Assembly criticized the 
Constitution for being a potential lawyers’ paradise. Others, like Dr. 
B. R. Ambedkar, defended the provisions of judicial review as being 
necessary.31 According to Dr. Ambedkar, the provisions for judicial 
review, in particular the writ jurisdiction that gave quick relief 
against the abridgment of fundamental rights, constituted the heart of 
the Constitution; the very soul of it.32 
The National Movement for Independence favored a 
constitutional bill of rights that would act as a bulwark against state 
authoritarianism and assuage the fears of the religious minorities. The 
Nehru Committee, which gave its report on Fundamental Rights in 
1928, strongly recommended that the future constitution of India 
contain a declaration of fundamental rights.33 The British 
government, however, rejected the Indian demand and did not 
incorporate a declaration of fundamental rights in the Government of 
India Act of 1935. The British Simon Commission rejected the 
proposal for a declaration of fundamental rights based on the 
traditional British distrust of such declarations observing: 
We are aware that such provisions have been inserted in many 
constitutions, notably in those of the European States formed 
after the War. Experience however has not shown them to be 
of any great practical value. Abstract declarations are useless,  
 
 31. C.A.D. Vol. 7. 700. 
 32. C.A.D. Vol. 7. 953. See B. SHIVA RAO, THE FRAMING OF INDIA’S CONSTITUTION 311 
(N.M. Tripathi ed., 1968) [hereinafter SHIVA RAO]. 
 33. SHIVA RAO, supra  note 32, at 173. 
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unless there exist the will and the means to make them 
effective.34 
The Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform reiterated 
that view: 
Either the declaration of rights is of so abstract a nature that it 
has no legal effect of any kind or its legal effect will be to 
impose an embarrassing restriction on the power of the 
Legislature and to create a grave risk that a large number of 
laws may be declared invalid by the courts because of the 
inconsistency with one or other of the rights so declared.35 
Interestingly, the draft submitted by Mr. Atlee to the Committee 
recommended incorporation of a declaration of fundamental rights. 
Mr. Atlee later became the prime minister of England during Indian 
independence. Professor Ramswami suggested36 that precise framing 
of the declaration would avoid large-scale invalidation of the laws by 
the courts. 
D. Judicial Activism from 1950 to 1975 
The supreme Court of India began as a positivist court and strictly 
followed the traditions of the British courts. In A.K. Gopalan v. State 
of Madras37 the Court declined an invitation made on behalf of the 
petitioner, Mr. Gopalan, a communist leader who had been detained 
under a law of preventive detention, to read the provisions of the 
Constitution liberally so as to give effect to the spirit of the 
Constitution rather than remaining in the confines of its text. The 
Court gave a narrow construction to words such as “personal liberty” 
and “procedure established by legitimated law” contained in Article 
21 of the Constitution. In matters of personal liberty as well as 
regulation of the economy, the Court observed judicial restraint and 
 
 34. Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, part I, para. 366 
(1934) (H. M. Stationary Office, London). 
 35. Id. 
 36. RAMASWAMI, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (1946). Sir Maurice Gwyer, the Chief Justice 
of the Federal Court of India, agreed with the author’s view in the Forward to Ramaswami’s 
book.  
 37. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27.  
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legitimated the actions of the government. These were the days of the 
welfare state and the Court was supposed to legitimize the expanded 
sphere of the State and its powers. The Court and Parliament clashed 
only on the scope of the right to property. Parliament wanted to usher 
in a radical programme of changes in property relations and the Court 
had adopted the policy of interpreting the right to property 
expansively so as to impede such program. Since the Constitution 
allowed Parliament to amend the constitution, a decision of the Court 
could be circumvented. Since the Constitution could be amended by a 
majority vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting and an 
absolute majority of the total membership in each house of 
Parliament,38 and the ruling party could easily muster such majority, 
the Court’s decisions could not obstruct the property rights reforms. 
While on the topic of the right to property the Court was humbled, 
it had started interpreting other provisions of the Constitution more 
meaningfully so as to expand the rights of the people. In 1962 in 
Sakal Newspapers (Private) Ltd. India,39 it held that a law which 
prescribed the number of pages, price and space for advertisement of 
a newspaper violated the freedom of the press, which was included in 
freedom of speech guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
The Court held that unlike any other business which could be 
regulated in the interest of the general public as provided by Clause 
(6) of Article 19, the press could be restricted only on the specific 
grounds given in clause (2) of that Article, such as the sovereignty 
and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with 
foreign states, public order, decency or morality or in relation to 
contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence. The Court 
thus inferred the doctrine of preferred freedoms from the subtle 
distinction between Clauses (2) and (6) of Article 19. Similarly, the 
Court held that affirmative action programs in favor of discriminated 
classes of people enjoined by Clause (4) of Article 15 had to 
complement, and not contradict, the general provision contained in 
Article 15(1), which forbade discrimination on grounds such as 
religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Reserved seats in 
educational institutions or jobs in government service could be 
 
 38. INDIA CONST. art. 368. 
 39. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 305.  
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reserved for discriminated classes without eliminating the right to 
equality. Therefore discriminated status should not be determined on 
the basis of caste alone, though it could be one of the factors for such 
a determination, and the total number of seats or jobs reserved should 
not exceed more than half of the total number of seats or jobs 
available.40 This was judicial activism during the sixties. 
During the late sixties, the Court seems to have become bolder, 
and it soon challenged Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. 
This brought about a major confrontation between the Court and 
Parliament. In 1967, the Court, by a thin majority of 6-5, held in 
Golaknath v. Punjab41 that Parliament could not amend the 
Constitution to take away or abridge fundamental rights. This 
decision was severely criticized. Parliament retaliated by passing the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment which explicitly stated that Parliament 
was not limited in its power of constitutional amendment. When that 
amendment was challenged, the Court, sitting in its largest strength of 
13 judges held in Kesavanand Bharati v. Kerala42 that although 
Parliament could amend every provision of the Constitution, it could 
not alter the basic structure of the Constitution. This decision seemed 
most unsustainable and contrary to the theory of judicial review. It 
seemed to wrestle supremacy to a non-elected court and against the 
elected Parliament. However, during the 1975 emergency, the ruling 
party passed such draconian amendments with the help of its brute 
majority and absence of any political opposition that the limitation 
upon Parliament’s power of constitutional amendment acquired 
legitimacy. The Supreme Court struck down in Indira Gandhi v. Raj 
Narain43 a constitutional amendment which sought to validate the 
election of the Prime Minister, earlier set aside by the Allahabad 
High Court on some technical ground deemed destructive of the basic 
structure of the Constitution. Could the power of constitutional 
amendment, which is legislative in nature, be used for settling a 
dispute between two private parties regarding an election? This was a 
manifest example of the possibility of abuse of such power if given 
 
 40. Balaji v. Mysore, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649.  
 41. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643.  
 42. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461.  
 43. A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299.  
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without any limits. That decision conferred legitimacy on the basic 
structure doctrine. That doctrine is posited on the hypothesis that the 
power of constitutional amendment could not be equal to the power 
of making a constitution. The power of constitutional amendment 
could not be used for repealing the entire constitution. The identity of 
the original constitution must remain in tact. This doctrine imposes a 
restriction on the power of the majority and is in that sense a counter 
majoritarian check on democracy in the interest of democracy.44 That 
power made the Indian Supreme Court the most powerful apex court 
in the world. It also made it a political institution because the ultimate 
determination of a basic structure was bound to be a political 
judgment. 
II. POST-EMERGENCY ACTIVISM : FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
The post emergency period (1977-98) is known as the period of 
judicial activism because it was during this period that the Court’s 
jurisprudence blossomed with doctrinal creativity and processual 
innovations. Activism, however, can easily transcend the borders of 
judicial review and turn into populism and excessivism. Activism is 
populism when doctrinal effervescence transands the institutional 
capacity of the judiciary to translate the doctrine into reality, and it is 
excessivism when a court undertakes responsibilities normally 
discharged by other co-ordinate organs of the government. 
Before the Court embarked upon activism, it had to overcome the 
negative image that it had acquired from its decision in A.D.M. 
Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla .45  
A. The Fundamental Rights Case: Judicial Surrender 
Although the Supreme Court of India became the most powerful 
apex court due to its power to invalidate even a constitutional 
amendment, its institutional weakness was ultimately revealed 
through its decision in A. D. M. Jabalpur.46 Article 352 of the 
 
 44. See Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Gerald Dvekworth & Co. 1977). 
 45. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207. 
 46. Id. 
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Constitution provides for the proclamation of an emergency by the 
President “if he is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the 
security of India or any part of the territory of India is threatened, 
whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance.”47 This 
was the third proclamation made under Article 352 made since the 
commencement of the Constitution. The two previous proclamations 
were in response to wars with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1971. 
Proclamations of emergency made under Article 352 suspend the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19: freedom of speech and 
expression; freedom to assemble peacefully without arms; freedom to 
form associations; freedom to move within the territory of India; 
freedom to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; 
freedom to acquire, hold, and dispose of property; and freedom to 
practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or 
business. Any law made in derogation of those rights and any 
executive action taken under such a law is valid until the 
proclamation of emergency is revoked.48 The President has the power 
to suspend the right to move any court for the enforcement of any 
fundamental rights during their suspension. 49  
During the 1975 emergency, the President issued an order under 
Article 359 of the Constitution suspending the right to move any 
court to enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 21 
and 22 of the Constitution. In Makhan Singh v. Punjab,50 which arose 
out of a similar order issued by the President during the first 
emergency declared in 1962, the Court held that while one could not 
assert his right to life or personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of 
the Constitution, one could ask the Court to examine whether an 
order was ultra vires or whether the authority acted mala fide. 
However, the 1975 emergency and the 1962 emergency differed 
greatly. Under the 1962 emergency, maximum care was taken to 
cause minimum abridgement of personal liberties. Alternatively, 
under the 1975 emergency, maximum care was taken to ensure that 
no vestige of liberty survived. The Attorney General, Niren De, 
 
 47. INDIA CONST. art. 352. 
 48. INDIA CONST. art. 358. 
 49. INDIA CONST. art. 359. 
 50. See Makhan Singh, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. at 381. 
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argued that during a proclaimed emergency, even if the executive 
killed a person or imprisoned a person, it would not invite the Court 
to examine the validity of such actions.  
What did the suspension of the right to move any court for the 
enforcement of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by 
Article 21 mean? Did the rule that the executive could not take away 
an individual’s liberty unless the law authorized such a taking of 
liberty emanate from Article 21? Or did it exist independently of that 
Article as a basic principle or rule of law? The respondents in 
Makham Singh wanted the Court to examine whether the acts of 
detention were in accordance with the provisions of the Maintenance 
of Internal Security Act (MISA) under which they had been ordered. 
The basic rule of English jurisprudence is that no one can be 
deprived of his liberty unless he commits a distinct breach of law. 
This rule, laid down by the Privy Council in Eshugbayi v. Govt. of 
Nigeria,51 was in fact anterior to the Constitution of India and 
survived after adoption of India’s Constitution by virtue of Article 
372 which states: “all the law in force in the territory of India 
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall 
continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a 
competent Legislature or other competent authority.”52 Article 372 
saves not only the “laws” but also saves the “law,” which includes all 
law established through judicial decisions as well as through custom. 
When the Privy Council decided the Eshyugbai case, the constituent 
act of British India did not contain any declaration of fundamental 
rights. The principle stated in that case did not emanate from any 
“right” but from the concept of “liberty” in the Hohfeldian53 sense, 
which was implicit in any lawful governance. 
Hohfeld distinguished right from liberty, and power from 
immunity—which are often used interchangeably but are 
conceptually different. Right and duty are corelative concepts. If I 
have a right against you, you have a duty towards me. Jural opposite 
of right is no right and jural opposite of duty is no duty. No duty 
 
 51. 1931 L.R. 670 (C.A.). 
 52. INDIA CONST. art. 372. 
 53. WESTLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (Water 
Wheeler Look ed., 1966). 
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means liberty. I have liberty to do whatever pleases me because I 
have no duty to refrain from doing it, and no one has a right to 
prohibit me from doing so. Power means the capacity to create jural 
relations and to create rights and liabilities. The jural correlative of 
power is liability. If I have power over you, you have liability 
towards me. Courts have power to pass judgments that impose 
liabilities on those subject to its jurisdiction. Parliament has power to 
make laws. Parliament, however, cannot make a law that takes away 
or abridges a fundamental right, thus creating a disability. A minor 
cannot make a contract, and a person cannot sue another for recovery 
of a debt if the period of limitation has elapsed. These are disabilities. 
The jural opposite of power is disability and the jural opposite of 
liability is immunity. Trade unions cannot be sued for torts and the 
President or the Governor can not be personally liable in respect of 
any contract or assurance made or executed for the purposes of the 
Constitution or for the purposes of any enactment relating to the 
Government of India.54 These are examples of immunities. Although 
the word “right’ is often used to describe liberty, power, or immunity, 
Hohfeld explained the specific meaning of each word. Hohfeld 
described liberty as described above as an apriori condition of the 
rule of law. It does not owe its origin to any bill of rights and exists to 
the extent that it is not restricted by any law. People who encroach 
upon liberty must show their right to do so. Eshyugbai’s dicta 
referred to the concept of liberty and not to the concept of right in the 
Hohfeldian sense. 
After suspension of the right given by Article 21, did “liberty” in 
the Hohfeldian sense survive under Article 372 of the Constitution? 
Was “liberty” of an individual not anterior to Article 21 of the 
Constitution?. Even courts in colonial India gave protection to liberty 
by insisting that the executive must act according to law. Was the 
liberty that Indian citizens possessed different from the liberty in 
English constitutional law, where supremacy of Parliament is a 
constitutional axiom? The questions posed were whether persons 
were detained according to law, whether the law authorizing the 
detention was valid, and whether the executive had applied its mind 
 
 54. INDIA CONST. art. 299 (2).  
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or whether it had acted mala fide. The court considered these 
questions in appeals filed against the decisions of the seven High 
Courts—Allahabad, Bombay, Delhi, Karnataka, M. P., Punjab and 
Rajasthan—in which Attorney General Niren De had argued to reject 
the petitions in limine. In the Supreme Court, the Attorney General 
argued that the Court may grant relief only if the order of detention 
was bad on its face. It would be facially invalid if it was passed by a 
person not authorized to pass it or was passed for a purpose outside 
those mentioned in the MISA. The majority held, 4-1, that no court 
could examine the actions of the executive. The four majority 
Justices who upheld the government’s power eventually became the 
Chief Justices of India. The dissenter, Justice Khanna, paid the price 
for his judgment when he was superseded by a junior Justice and not 
appointed Chief Justice. 
The decision in the Jabalpur case was severely criticized. 55 Even 
the judges following the black letter law tradition would not have 
rendered such a decision. The black letter law always gives 
maximum protection to individual liberty through various common 
law statutory interpretation devices. The English courts have always 
applied a rule of stric t interpretation to statutes that impinged on 
individual liberties. When two interpretations are possible, the courts 
prefer the interpretation most favorable to the citizen. 
In Jabalpur, the Supreme Court held that the basic principle of 
law, that people could not be divested of their liberties unless they 
committed a breach of the law, did not survive the proclamation of 
emergency. The Supreme Court had struck down a constitutional 
amendment as against the basic structure of the Constitution in the 
Prime Minister Election Case56 just a few months before Jabalpur. 
The Court did not consider the respondents’ argument that the above 
principle of law, part of the basic structure of the Constitution, could 
not be whittled down through Presidential orders issued under Article 
359 of the Constitution. If the Court could void a constitutional 
amendment contrary to the basic structure of the Constitution, why 
could it not void an order of the President issued under Article 359 of 
 
 55. See, e.g., SEERVAI, supra note 3; UPENDRA BAXI, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND 
POLITICS 79-120 (1980). 
 56. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299. 
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the Constitution that resulted in the elimination of one of the most 
basic features of the Constitution? It was strange that the argument of 
fear, accepted in Kesavanand Bharati and realized in the Prime 
Minister Election Case, could not be invoked against the order of the 
President suspending access to courts for the enforcement of the rule 
of law. The complaisancy of the judges was obvious. Justice 
Chandrachud, while responding to the argument that the presidential 
order might give power to the government to arbitrarily shoot any 
person, said: 
Counsel after counsel expressed the fear that during the 
emergency, the executive may whip and strip and starve the 
detenu and if this be our judgement [sic], even shoot him 
down. Such misdeeds have not tarnished the record of Free 
India and I have a diamond-bright, diamond-hard hope that 
such things will never come to pass.57 
Justice Beg, in going even further than Justice Chandrachud in 
approving of the emergency regime, said “Furthermore, we 
understand that the care and concern bestowed by the State 
authorities upon the welfare of detenus who are well housed, well fed 
and well treated, is almost maternal.”58 
While the judges were giving such an optimistic picture of the 
Indian democracy through their judgments, the emergency regime 
committed various atrocities. In the Kakayam police camp, an 
engineering student, P. Rajan, was arrested on February 29, 1976, 
and was murdered by police torture.59 
B. The End of Emergency and Elections 
In 1977, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi advised the President to 
dissolve the Lok Sabha and hold new elections. All of the non-
Congress political parties, except for the Communist parties and 
some regional parties, formed a single political party called the Janata 
Party to fight the election. As a result, the Congress party lost heavily 
 
 57. A.D.M. Jabalpur, A.J.R. 1976 S.C. at 1349. 
 58. Id. at 1319. 
 59. SEERVAI, supra  note 3, at 1. 
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and even Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was defeated in her own 
constituency. Since the Janata party was a conglomeration of various 
parties with contradictory ideologies and interests, it was bound to be 
short lived and, in fact, it ended within two years. However, during 
the short period of its rule, the Janata party amended the Constitution 
by expunging those draconian elements added to the Constitution in 
1976 by the Forty Second Amendment.60 In 1978, the Forty-Fourth 
Amendment changed the emergency in the following ways: (1) it 
substituted the words “armed rebellion” in place of the words 
“internal disturbance” in clause one of Article 352 to make the 
promulgation of emergency more difficult;61(2) in Article 359, which 
enabled the President to suspend the right to move any court in 
respect to the fundamental rights as mentioned by him in his order, 
the words “except Articles 20 and 21” were added in order to 
preserve the rights given by those Articles.62  
The Supreme Court realized that its decision in the Jabalpur cost 
it the social esteem that it enjoyed. Although in the Prime Minister 
Election Case, it managed to satisfy both the constituencies of the 
government and the people, it failed to satisfy the people’s 
constituency in Jabalpur. 
C. Post-Emergency Activism: Atonement for the Past or Self -
Legitimization for the Future? 
Post emergency judicial activism grew out of the realization that 
narrow construction of constitutional provisions like Article 21 in A. 
K. Gopalan v. State of Madras63 was contradic ting the Court’s liberal 
stance in the basic structure cases.64 If the Court had envisioned a 
 
 60. INDIA CONST. amend. 43 (Amendment Act, 1977); INDIA CONST. amend. 44 
(Amendment Act, 1978). See also S. P. SATHE, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 170-71, app. 
(1989). 
 61. INDIA CONST. amend. 44, § 37(a)(i) (Amendment Act, 1978). 
 62. Id. § 40. Article 20 provides the following rights: (1) the right not to be punished for 
an act that was not an offence at the time the act was committed, and the right not to be 
subjected to a punishment higher than that prescribed when the act was committed; (2) the right 
not to be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once; and (3) the right not to 
be compelled to give evidence against oneself. INDIA CONST. art. 20. Article 21 conferred the 
right to life and personal liberty. INDIA CONST. art. 21. 
 63. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27. 
 64. See supra note 42. 
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more positive role for itself in Indian democracy through the basic 
structure doctrine, it could no longer continue to adopt a positivistic 
role while interpreting other provisions of the Constitution. Although 
the Indian judiciary was considered impartial and principled, its 
jurisprudence was essentially for property owners, princes, political 
leaders and, at the most, civil servants. The political opposition had 
also not been very sanguine of the Court’s jurisprudence. From 
Gopalan to ShivKant Shukla , the dissenters had not received its 
sympathetic consideration. The legal positivism of the Court helped 
the political establishment over the political dissenters and the 
property owners over the economic reformers. The small man could 
not afford the luxury of the Court’s judicial review.  
The Court must have obviously realized that in the Indian 
democracy, high public esteem alone enabled the Court to withstand 
the intolerance of a hegemonic executive. During the emergency the 
Court had learned that it could not stand up against the executive on 
its own during the emergency. For the common people, the Court was 
an elitist institution which supported the political establishment. The 
Court’s fight with Parliament over right to property appeared to the 
common people to be a mock fight between an elitist court and a 
majoritarian legislature. The Court is, after all, a weak institution.  
Hamilton called the court system the weakest organ of 
government because it had control over neither the sword nor the 
purse. A court becomes strong only when it identifies itself with the 
disadvantaged minorities and they see the court as an independent 
institution, a bulwark against oppression and tyranny. A court gains 
strength only by carving a niche for itself in the minds of the people. 
A court must appear to the people as their protector. It must not only 
be, but also must appear to be impartial, principled, and capable of 
achieving results. According to Baxi, “judicial populism was partly 
an aspect of post-emergency catharsis. Partly, it was an attempt to 
refurbish the image of the court tarnished by a few emergency 
decisions and also an attempt to seek new, historical bases of 
legitimation of judicial power.”65 While Baxi calls the entire exercise 
“judicial populism,” this writer makes a distinction between judicial 
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populism and judicial activism. Judicial populism is an aberration 
that takes place either when the Court is swayed by euphoria or when 
it overreaches itself. Judicial activism of the post-emergency period 
means liberal interpretation of constitutional provisions like Articles 
21 and 14, and reconceptualization of the judicial process by making 
it more accessible and participatory. The Court used judicial activism 
in an attempt to reinstate the image of the Court and to increase its 
political power vis-a-vis other organs of government.66  
Post-emergency judicial activism was probably inspired by the 
Court’s realization that its elitist social image would not make it 
strong enough to withstand the future onslaught of a powerful 
political establishment. Therefore consciously or unconsciously, the 
Court began moving in the direction of the people. I would not, 
however, share Professor Baxi’s optimism that the Court, for the first 
time, became the Court for the Indians, because even now the Court 
continues to be inaccessible to a large number of Indians and justice 
remains elusive to many because of its delays, expense and 
formalism. Nonetheless, in relative terms, the Court became much 
more accessible and its doctrinal law more people -oriented. For this, 
the Court adopted two strategies: (1) it reinterpreted the provisions 
for fundamental rights in a more liberal manner in order to maximize 
the rights of the people, particularly the disadvantaged; and (2) it 
facilitated access to the courts by relaxing its technical rules of locus 
standi, entertaining letter petitions or acting suo moto, and 
developing pro-active public law technology for the enforcement of 
human rights. 
D. Article 21: Life, Liberty, and Due Process of Law 
Article 21 of the Constitution was bound to be the first on the 
Supreme Court’s agenda because its restrictive interpretation in 
Gopalan67 and its total demise in Jabalpur68 made the important 
fundamental right to life and liberty entirely dependent on the sweet 
 
 66. Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme 
Court of India , in JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL POWER 294 (Rajeev Dhavan, et al. eds. 1985).  
 67. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27.  
 68. See Jabalpur, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. at 1207. 
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will of the parliamentary majority. The Constituent Assembly had 
purposely rejected the expression “due process of law,” which was 
the source of judicial activism in the United States, and instead 
adopted a more specific expression: “procedure established by law.” 
The Supreme Court of India had interpreted these words very 
narrowly in Gopalan. 
Article 21 of the Constitution says that “no person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law.” In Gopalan, the Supreme Court held that the 
words “personal liberty” meant only freedom from arbitrary arrest 
and that the words “procedure established by law” meant such 
procedure as was prescribed by any statute. Article 19, which 
guaranteed the seven fundamental rights, included the right to move 
freely within the territory of India.69 The State may impose 
reasonable restrictions upon that right “in the interests of the general 
public or for the protection of the interests of the Scheduled tribes.”70 
Some argued that where people were detained under a law of 
preventive detention, their rights to move within the territory of India 
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d) was restricted; therefore, the state 
should prove that the law of preventive detention was a reasonable 
restriction upon freedom in the interests of the general public as 
required by clause five of Article 19. The Court, however, held that 
only free persons had rights given by Article 19. Unless the state 
arrested a person for making a speech, holding an assembly, forming 
an association, or for entering a territory, the arrest had to be 
according to law and the validity of such arrest or detention could 
only be examined with reference to the person’s right to personal 
liberty guaranteed by Article 21, and not with reference to any of the 
rights guaranteed by Article 19. The Court distinguished direct 
restrictions on any of the seven rights guaranteed by Article 19 and 
indirect restrictions on those rights consequent upon detention. 
Detention for preventing a person from exercising any of the 
freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1) constituted a direct restriction 
on those freedoms, but detention for preventing the person from 
causing breach of public order or subverting the security of the state 
 
 69. INDIA CONST. art. 19, § 1(d). 
 70. INDIA CONST. art. 19(5).  
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caused an indirect restriction on those freedoms. For example, if a 
person is detained for theft or murder, the law authorizing detention 
(the Indian Penal Code) need not be examined from the standpoint of 
Article 19; however, if a person is detained for committing sedition 
or obscenity, the detention must also be valid under Article 19.71 In 
the first case, the denial of liberty results in a restriction on the 
freedoms guaranteed by Article 19, however, in the second case, the 
denial of freedoms results in the denial of liberty. 
The Court read Articles 19 and 21 as mutually exclusive. A 
similar interpretation prevailed in a case regarding the right to 
property guaranteed by Article 31 and the right to acquire, hold and 
dispose of property provided in by Article 19(1)(f). Article 31 stated 
that no one shall be deprived of his property except by authority of 
law, and Article 19(1)(f) guaranteed the right to acquire, hold, and 
dispose of property. The latter right was subject to the state’s power 
to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public 
or for the protection of the interests of the scheduled tribes. The 
Court held that when a person was deprived of his property, the right 
to acquire, hold, and dispose of property did not attach because the 
right belonged only to a person who had property.72 Article 31 only 
governed cases of total deprivation, whereas Article 19 governed 
restrictions on acquiring, holding, and disposing of property. Since 
the Court held that “deprivation” would invite liability to pay 
compensation, it thought that the protection of Article 19 was 
unnecessary. However, the 1955 amendment to the Constitution 
restricted payment of compensation to cases of acquisition of 
property by the state and provided that the Court would not determine 
adequacy of compensation. In this regard, the Court fell back upon 
Article 19 for greater protection of the right to property. In K. K. 
 
 71. See Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar , A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955 (holding section 124-A 
of the I.P.C., which punishes the offense of sedition, to be a reasonable restriction on freedom 
of speech and expression); see also  Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra , A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 
881 (holding section 292 of the I.P.C., which punishes the offense of obscenity, to be a 
reasonable restriction on the freedoms of speech and expression).  
 72. The right to hold and dispose of property was available only to a person who had 
property. If his property was taken away, he could only invoke Article 31. However, if he had 
property but its use was restricted, he could invoke Article 19.  
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Kochuni v. State of Madras,73 the Court held that when a person is 
deprived of property through acquisition of the property by the state 
or otherwise, the law that authorized the acquisition or deprivation 
must be a reasonable restriction on the right to hold property given by 
Article 19(1)(f). Incidentally, Article 19(1)(f) was deleted from the 
Constitution in 1978 by the Forty-Fourth Amendment.74 
The above interpretation of the relationship between Article 31 
and Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution did not extend to the 
relationship between Article 21 and Article 19(1)(d). Gopalan 
continued to operate in cases of personal liberty and freedoms 
guaranteed by Article 19. In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.,75 the 
Supreme Court gave broader meaning to the words “personal liberty” 
so as to include within their fold the right to privacy. The majority 
Justices held that the words “personal liberty” in Article 21 included 
not only mere protection from arbitrary arrest, but all other aspects of 
liberty not covered by Article 19. The minority disagreed with the 
exclusion of freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 from the scope of 
“personal Liberty.” In Satwant Singh v. Assistant Passport Officer,76 
the Court held that the right to personal liberty included the right to 
go abroad and declared certain provisions of the Passport Act 
unconstitutional and void. The Court objected to the Act’s failure to 
provide a procedure for regulating the grant or denial of passports. 
The Court said that travel abroad was a fundamental right within 
“personal liberty” subject to restriction or regulation by law. In 
response to Satwant, Parliament enacted the Passport Act of 1967, 
specifying who can obtain a passport, when a passport can be 
refused, and the application procedure for a passport. 
A major breakthrough came in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of 
India .77 Maneka Gandhi had her passport impounded and she 
challenged this action on the ground that it violated her personal 
liberty. Mrs. Gandhi had not been given a hearing regarding the 
impounding of her passport. The Supreme Court not only broadened 
 
 73. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1080. 
 74. INDIA CONST. art. 19(1), cl.(f) was superceded by section 2 of the INDIA CONST. 
amend. 44 (Forty-Fourth Amendment Act, 1978). 
 75. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1295. 
 76. Satwant Singh v. Asst. Passport Officer, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1836. 
 77. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597. 
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the meaning of the words “personal liberty,” but also adopted the 
concept of procedural due process within the words ”procedure 
established by law.” The Court rejected the earlier view that 
“personal liberty” included all attributes of liberty except those 
mentioned in Article 19. In Maneka Gandhi, the Court recognized 
that when a law restricts personal liberty, a court should examine 
whether the restriction on personal liberty also imposed restrictions 
on any of the rights given by Article 19. The Court held that personal 
liberty includes “a variety of rights which go to constitute the 
personal liberty of man,” 78 in addition to those mentioned in Article 
19, and that one such right included in “personal liberty” is the right 
to go abroad. 
The Court also held that impounding Mrs. Gandhi’s passport 
without giving her a hearing violated procedure established by law. 
The procedure must provide a just and fair hearing. The rules of 
natural justice, a term used for a fair hearing, are the essential 
requisites of fair procedure. These rules are: (1) no one should be a 
judge in his own cause; and (2) no one should be condemned 
unheard. The hearing must be a “procedure established by law” that 
provides an unbiased decision maker and a reasonable opportunity 
for the person whose personal liberty is at stake to make a defense. In 
Maneka Gandhi, the Court had to decide whether Mrs. Gandhi was 
entitled to a hearing before the impounding of her passport. The 
Court conceded that some situations require urgent action, making a 
prior hearing not feasible. In these exceptional situations when a prior 
hearing was not given, the authorities must give a post-decisional 
hearing. On the assurance of the Attorney General that a post-
decisional hearing would be given to Mrs. Gandhi, the majority, 
barring Justice Beg, upheld the government’s impounding of Mrs. 
Gandhi’s passport. Justice Beg held that the government’s action of 
impounding the passport was unconstitutional and void. 
In Maneka Gandhi, the Court clearly overruled Gopalan on the 
following issues: (1) that the law authorizing deprivation of personal 
liberty must be valid not only under Article 21, but also under Article 
19; (2) the words “life” and “personal liberty” had wider meanings 
 
 78. Id. at 622. 
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that would be broadened from time to time, and both were open 
textured expressions; and (3) the words “procedure” and “established 
by law” meant not only the procedure prescribed by law, but also 
such procedures considered just and fair in civilized society. 
The most significant aspect of Maneka Gandhi was that the Court 
laid down a seminal principle of constitutional interpretation: There 
cannot be a mere textual construction of the words of the 
Constitution. Those words are pregnant with meanings that unfold 
when different situations arise. For example, the Constitution 
expressly mentions the right to freedom of speech and expression but 
does not mention the right to freedom of the press. The Supreme 
Court has, however, held that the right to freedom of speech includes 
the right to freedom of the press.79 
Constitutional expressions are open-textured and it is for the 
reviewing court to develop nuances in the context of emerging 
situations. The Court reads the Constitution not merely as a statute 
but as an organic law of the nation. In Francis Coralie Mullin  v. 
Administrator Union Territory of Delhi, Justice Bhagwati said: 
This principle of interpretation which means that a 
constitutional provision must be construed, not in a narrow and 
constricted sense, but in a wide and liberal manner so as to 
anticipate and take account of changing conditions and 
purposes so that the constitutional provision does not get 
atrophied or fossilised but remains flexible enough to meet the 
newly emerging problems and challenges, applies with greater 
force in relation to a fundamental right enacted by the 
Constitution.80 
 
 79. The Court held that the right to freedom of speech also includes the right to receive 
information. This writer has submitted elsewhere that the right to receive information is only 
partly covered by the right to freedom of speech, because my right to receive information does 
not obligate the other person to provide me information. In my opinion, the right to know is 
also covered by the right to personal liberty and the right to procedure established by law and 
guaranteed by Article 21. See S.P. SATHE, THE RIGHT TO KNOW 47 (1991). 
 80. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746. 
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E. Personal Liberty 
The words “personal liberty” acquired a new dimension when the 
Court debated prisoners’ rights. Are prisoners entitled to any rights? 
Are they denuded of all the fundamental rights? Earlier, the Court 
had held that prisoners did not lose their right to freedom of speech 
during incarceration.81 In Charles Sobraj82 and Sunil Batra,83 the 
Court held that prisoners were not denuded of their fundamental 
rights, like their right to equality or their right to life or personal 
liberty, beyond that taken away by the nature of the imprisonment 
itself. The Court held that even a prisoner was entitled to be treated 
according to the prison rules, and even the prison rules could not 
violate the prisoner’s fundamental rights such as rights to equality, of 
life, and of personal liberty. For example, a prisoner certainly could 
not be subjected to inhumane torture during imprisonment. Prisoners 
are also entitled to other rights such as freedom of religion. Prisoners’ 
exercise of the fundamental rights are restricted only in so far as they 
are under detention. 
The right to personal liberty also includes various women’s rights 
such as the right not to be asked information about menstrual cycles 
or pregnancies on job applications in the public sector,84 the right to 
the sanctity of her body (rape was not only an offense under criminal 
law, but an onslaught on personal liberty),85 the right to the 
presumption of chastity, and the right not to subject a child to a 
paternity test unless a prima facie case against the mother during the 
period of conception is established.86 
F. Procedure Established by Law 
The Court also liberally construed the words “procedure 
established by law” to include within it all those essential aspects of 
 
 81. State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar , A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 424. 
 82. Charles Sobraj v. Superintendent Central Jail, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1514.  
 83. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1675; A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1579. 
 84. Neera Mathur v. L.I.C., A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 392. 
 85. Bodhisatwa Goutam v. Subhra Chakraborty, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 922; see also S. P. 
Sathe, Gender, Constitution and the Courts, in ENGENDERING LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
LOTIKA SARKAR 117 (Amita Dhanda & Archana Parashar eds., 1999).  
 86. Goutam Kundu v. West Bengal, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2295.  
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procedure that constitute due process of law. The makers of the 
Constitution purposely avoided the use of that expression because 
they were apprehensive of importing the substantive due process 
concept into the Constitution. However, procedural due process 
provides the essentials of the rule of law. In Gopalan, the Court held 
that the procedure established by law meant the procedure prescribed 
by enacted law. Between the two meanings of the word “law”, “lex” 
(enacted law) and “jus” (justice), the Court chose the former and 
rejected the latter. A person’s liberty could be taken away by law and 
by such procedure as the law provided. A court had no power to 
question the fairness or justness of the law or the procedure. The 
Court later held that the procedure provided by the law must contain 
the essentials of fair procedure—the principles of natural justice. The 
word “established” did not mean “prescribed” but meant 
“institutionalized.” Such institutionalization takes place after a long 
tradit ion and practice. The Court therefore acquired the power to 
decide whether proper procedure was prescribed by the legislature 
and followed by the executive. 
The Court held that a person was entitled to an investigation and 
trial; therefore, the long detention of a person as an under-trial 
prisoner violated the “procedure established by law.”87 However, in 
each case the Court determines whether the time taken for 
investigation was considered delayed. 88 Sometimes the accused may 
cause the delay himself and cannot move to quash the prosecution 
due to delay. Such a result would amount to helping the accused 
evade the law.89 
Although the Constitution provides that every arrested person may 
consult a lawyer of choice,90 the Court previously held the provision 
was merely permissive and did not necessarily cast a burden on the 
state to provide free legal aid.91 However, after the Forty-Second 
Amendment inserted a clause into the Constitution obligating the 
 
 87. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1360. 
 88. Raghubir Singh v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 149. 
 89. State of Maharashtra v. C. P. Shah, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1675. 
 90. INDIA CONST. art. 22(1). 
 91. Janardan Reddy v. Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 217. For a comprehensive discussion, 
see R. Prasannan, Counsel in the Criminal Process, 10 J. INDIAN L. INST. 637 (1968). 
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state to provide free legal aid,92 the Court adopted the provision 
requiring free legal aid as an essential aspect of the procedure 
established by law.93 In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delph 
Administration case, the Court also held that hand-cuffing prisoners 
violated the procedure established by law.94 
Thus far, the Supreme Court has construed the three expressions 
in Article 21, “life,” “personal liberty,” and “procedure established by 
law,” in an expansive manner in order to give individuals substantive 
due process of law as understood in the United States. Although the 
drafters of the Constitution purposely avoided including a due 
process clause, it has been brought into the Constitution through 
judicial interpretation.95  
G. Original Understanding and Constitutional Interpretation 
The Court has clearly departed from the original understanding of 
the Constituent Assembly. However, the original understanding of 
the drafters of the Constitution can never bind a constitutional court. 
In the United States, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board 
of Education96 that mandated integrated schools prompted a great 
debate whether the decision was consistent with the original 
understanding of those who enacted the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of the United States Supreme Court 
had expressed his thoughts on this subject thirty-two years before the 
Brown decision: 
When we are dealing with words that also are constituent act, 
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that 
they have called into life a being the development of which 
 
 92. INDIA CONST. art. 39-A. 
 93. Suk Das v. Union Territory, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 991; M. H. Hoskot v. Maharashtra, 
A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1548. 
 94. Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1535. 
 95. The activism of the Supreme Court of India was similar to the activism of the United 
States Supreme Court during the 1950s and the 1960s in cases like Mapp v. Ohio , 328 U.S. 25 
(1949), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 33 (1963). In Mapp, the United States Supreme 
Court held that evidence collected through illegal searches was not admissible as evidence. In 
Gideon, the Court held that without legal aid to the accused, no conviction in a criminal case 
could be upheld.  
 96. 360 U.S. 201 (1954). 
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could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of 
its begetters. It was enough for them to realise or to hope that 
they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has 
cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they 
created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the 
light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what 
was said a hundred years ago.97 
H. Article 21 and the Right to Honest and Efficient Governnance 
Article 21 has become the means by which to create new rights 
and entitlements. Questions regarding the constitutional validity of 
death sentences, a person’s liberty to die, whether personal liberty 
included the right to privacy, and whether freedom of speech 
included the right to information, were legitimate concerns of judicial 
activism because the Court was called upon to articulate the rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. Similarly, a prisoner’s right to 
humane treatment, a prisoner’s right to a speedy trial, and an accused 
criminal’s right to legal aid emanated from the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by Articles 21 and 22 and the directive principles of state 
policy contained in Article 39-A of the Constitution. Even in regard 
to such rights, the Court can merely declare them part of the 
normative order, but cannot articulate them in reality, which is 
evident from the fact that a large number of people have obtained 
neither the right to speedy trial nor the right to legal aid.  
I. The Right to Equality: Article 14 
Another site for judicial activism has been Article 14 of the 
Constitution, which guarantees the right to equality before the law 
and equal protection of the law. Equality before the law does not 
mean mathematical equality. Human beings, as well as objects or 
causes, need to be treated differently and such different treatment 
does not necessarily result in denial of equality before the law. 
Children, women, underprivileged classes, and the physically 
handicapped need different, as well as preferential, treatment. 
 
 97. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
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Equality before the law means that equals should be treated equally, 
but unequals should not be treated equally. Therefore the doctrine of 
equality does not prevent the legislature from reasonably classifying 
people for differing treatment. The theory of reasonable classification 
addresses a group of people differently if that group is distinct from 
others and if the criteria of choosing such a group is rationally related 
to the object of the law. Reasonable classification answers three 
questions: (1) who is treated differently; (2) why are they treated 
differently; and (3) what is the different treatment. The theory 
requires that “who” and “why” be rationally related. In legal 
language, they should have a nexus. 
Professor P. K. Tripathi subjected the theory of classification to a 
searching analys is.98 His objection was that the theory did not require 
an established relationship between either “why” and “what” or 
“who” and “what”. It only required a nexus between “who” and 
“why”. For example, the Income Tax Act levies income tax 
according to the income of a person on the principle that the higher a 
person’s income, the more he will be taxed. The answer to the 
question “who is treated differently” is “those who have higher 
incomes. “Why are they treated differently?” The answer is that tax 
liability varies according to a person’s ability to pay. Thus “who” and 
“why” are rationally related. However, the Court seldom asked “what 
is the different treatment” and whether it was necessary for achieving 
the purposes. In this example, a court would not ask whether persons 
with the highest income should be charged income tax at the rate of 
30% or 40%. The Court left that to the legislature. Suppose, however, 
those with the highest incomes are taxed at a rate of 100%. Could it 
not be examined whether this amounts to expropriation? Such 
expropriation could also be violative of the right to equality. Thus, 
the “what” element has to be rationally related to the “why” and 
“who” elements. A court should insist that all three questions are 
interrelated, and should examine not only whether the criteria for 
distinguishing a group of people from others (who) are rationally 
related to the purpose of different treatment (why), but also whether 
so much of the amount and the type of different treatment (what) is 
 
 98. P. K. Tripathi, Equality Under the Constitution of India—Some General Principles, in 
SOME INSIGHTS INTO FUDNAMENTAL RIGHTS 45, 45-106 (University of Bombay 1972). 
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justified to achieve the purpose (why). The failure to do so results in 
formal equality at the expense of substantive equality. Professor 
Tripathi’s objection was that “the nexus test as applied by the Court 
did not require an examination of the question of quantum of the 
disparity created by the statute”.99 
In Balaji v. State of Mysore,100 Justice Gajendragadlkar had 
ignored the nexus formula and held that reservations for weaker 
sections of society enjoined by Article 15(4) of the Constitution 
should not exceed 50% of the total number of seats available for 
distribution. Otherwise, this would eclipse the right to equality itself. 
Article 15(1) provides the state shall not discriminate on the basis of 
religion, caste, sex, or place of birth. Article 15(4) was added to the 
Constitution in 1951 by the First Amendment, and provides that 
nothing in that Article or in Clause 2 of Article 29101 shall prevent the 
state from making any special provision for the advancement of 
socially and educationally underprivileged classes of citizens or for 
the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes. In this case, the Court 
did not merely examine the provisions of a statute to decide whether 
it offended the right to equality. The Court construed the two 
provisions of the Constitution contained in clause 1 and 4 of Article 
15 and further examined the proportion of the protective 
discrimination for the underprivileged classes in light of the 
overriding right to equality given by Article 14. Articles 15 and 16 
are species of, and must be in consonance with, Article 14. Balaji 
therefore declared that although caste may be one of the factors used 
for identifying the underprivileged, it may not be the sole criterion. 
This resulted from reading Clauses 1 and 4 of Article 15 together. It 
meant that protective discrimination in favor of socially and 
educationally underprivileged classes, particularly the scheduled 
castes and scheduled tribes, may not be considered discrimination on 
the basis of caste, even though caste is one factor for identifying 
underpriv ileged class. The Court had to make sure that classification 
 
 99. Id. at 67. 
 100. Balaji v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649. 
 101. It provides that no citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution 
maintained by the state or receiving aid out of state funds on the ground of religion, race, caste, 
or language.  
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was not made exclusively on any of the grounds forbidden by Article 
15(1), namely: religion, caste, sex, or place of birth. Further, the 
Court had to make sure that such special provisions for 
underprivileged classes did not make the right to equality guaranteed 
by Article 14 nugatory. 102 There the Court was not satisfied with 
merely examining whether the criteria of classification, namely social 
and educational underprivilege, was related to the achievement of 
advancing the interests of the underprivileged people, but whether so 
much reservation was not antithetical to the ideal of equality 
guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court did not say that such 
reservation was unnecessary to protect the interests of socially and 
educationally underprivileged classes of people. The Court said 
protective discrimination must be proportional to the totality of the 
opportunities available to the people in general. The Court thus 
applied a proportionality test for deciding whether so much 
reservation was desirable against the right to equality.  
The Court adopted the proportionality approach in Indra Sawhney 
v. India.103 The Supreme Court held that reservations should not 
exceed 50% of the total number of posts and that the relatively better 
off among the underprivileged classes should be excluded from 
reservation. This decision was given in response to a petition against 
the order of the V.P. Singh government to reserve 27% of the posts in 
government service for persons from underprivileged classes. 
III. GROWTH OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION: ACCESS TO AND 
DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
The Court liberalized its procedure with a view to facilitating 
access to the common man and increasing public participation in the 
judicial process as a means to control other bodies of government. 
This required radical change in the traditional paradigm of the 
judicial process. The traditional paradigm of the adversarial judicial 
process was designed for adjudication of disputes between private 
parties over contract, civil liability, property, or matrimonial matters. 
It was based on the following hypothesis: People are supposed to 
 
 102. The state shall not deny equality before the law and equal protection of law.  
 103. Indra Sawhney v. India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477. 
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know the law and their rights, and the judicial process is the least 
desirable method of settling disputes and should be used only when 
other methods—like inter-party settlement, conciliation, or 
mediation—do not work. The traditional legal theory of judicial 
process envisioned a passive role for the courts. It postulated: (1) The 
courts merely found the law or interpreted it, but did not make it; (2) 
if the courts made the law, they did so only to fill in the gaps left by 
statute, and then only to the extent necessary for the disposal of the 
matter; (3) a court will not decide a question of law unless the 
decision is absolutely necessary for the disposal of the matter before 
it; (4) after a matter is dealt with by a court and it has given its 
decision, such a decision is binding on the parties and the same 
matter cannot be raised again before the same court or a court of 
concurrent jurisdiction;104 (5) only a person who has suffered an 
injury or whose right is violated can approach the Court and initiate 
the judicial process; and (6) a person who has a cause of action and 
locus standi to raise an issue before a court of law must do so within 
a prescribed time limit provided by law. This paradigm postulates a 
litigant conscious of his rights and willing to vindicate them by 
resorting to the judicial process at the earliest point in time. In this 
paradigm of judicial process, only a person whose interest was 
prejudiced could have standing before the court and he must bring 
such an action within a reasonable time. 
The above paradigm of judicial process was based upon the 
negative concept of judicial function. The paradigm also applied to 
public law adjudication. It suited the laissez faire economy and the 
minimum state concept which was prevalent during the Nineteenth 
century. Public law was an exception to the generality of private law, 
and the application of the same paradigm to the public law was 
considered compatible with this concept. The concept of judicial 
function, however, was bound to change when the Court undertook 
the function of judicial review. With judicial review, the courts 
prevented illegality by the government and thereby protected 
individual liberty. The above paradigm had to change when courts 
 
 104. An appeal to a higher court may, however, lie against the decision. The decision of the 
highest appellate court is final and binding on the parties. Questions regarding rights and 
liabilities decided therein cannot be raised again before any court. This is known as res judicata. 
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started resolving conflicts between liberty and authority and 
especially so when the concept of the state changed. With transition 
from laissez faire state to welfare state, the nature of judicial review 
changed and the courts could not remain passive. Unlike litigation 
involving private disputes, public law litigation involved greater 
public interest because its direct concern was the maintenance of the 
rule of law. Therefore, the courts had to gradually create a new 
paradigm of judicial process for public law adjudication. 
A. Paradigm of Public Law Judicial Process 
In England, the king’s courts exercised the power of judicial 
review over all subordinate courts and administrative authorities to 
ensure they acted within the legal limits of their power. The courts 
had the power to issue prerogative writs such as habeas corpus, 
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto for enforcing 
such limits. If a person was illegally detained or arrested, a writ of 
habeas corpus was issued to set him free. If a tribunal or an 
administrative authority acted illegally, it was stopped from 
proceeding by the writ of prohibition, or its decision could be 
quashed by a writ of certiorari. Mandamus was a writ issued for 
compelling an authority to do what it was legally bound or forbidden 
to do. If a person occupied a public office illegally or by usurpation, 
he could be asked to vacate it by a writ of quo warranto. Due to the 
efficacy of these writs, Dicey said that liberty of an individual 
emanated from the remedies provided by the courts.105 For a long 
time, the courts followed the rules of private law adjudication while 
exercising the above jurisdiction. However, upon the realization that 
the larger public interest was involved in public law litigation, 
exceptions were made. In England, for example, an application for a 
writ could only be made by a person who had suffered an injury or 
whose rights had been violated. The writ of habeas corpus, however, 
could be sought by a friend or even a stranger on behalf of the person 
who was illegally detained. Subsequently, the rule of locus standi 
was liberalized with respect to other writs. The Law Commission of 
the United Kingdom suggested that locus standi be given to any 
 
 105. DICEY, supra note 10, at 195. 
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person who had “sufficient interest” in the matter, an idea 
incorporated in the Supreme Court Act of 1981.106  
The Supreme Court of India’s own paradigm of public law 
adjudication has been evolving by making a number of unorthodox 
innovations to traditional legal theory. The incorporation of a bill of 
rights in the Constitution and the vesting of special responsibility for 
protecting the rights of the people must have inspired the courts to be 
less technical and more informal. The law making function of the 
Court was never disguised. The traditional rules of prematurity, locus 
standi and ratio decidendi, were not strictly followed. These three 
concepts will be explained in the course of this discussion. 
B. Prematurity 
The rule of prematurity is that a court interprets a statute or 
discovers common law in so far as it is absolutely necessary for the 
disposal of a matter. If a matter can be disposed of without deciding 
the question of law, the court should do so. A court will not decide a 
question of law if the matter can be disposed of on a preliminary 
issue like lack of jurisdiction. A court will not decide the 
constitutionality of a statute if it is not absolutely necessary. This rule 
is known as the rule of prematurity, or “ripeness.” The Court does not 
answer abstract or hypothetical questions. The Supreme Court of 
India has not been strict about the doctrine of prematurity. 107 In a 
country where a majority of the people are poor and unaware of their 
rights, the Court thought it was better to decide such questions about 
fundamental rights before any actual invasion occurs. The Court 
thought such premature decisions would also prevent the unnecessary 
prolonging of litigation. In Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of 
Income Tax,108 the Court considered whether fundamental rights 
could be waived, even though the matter under contest could have 
been decided on other grounds. From a strict positivist standpoint, 
reaching the broader question of waiver of fundamental rights was 
 
 106. WADE & FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 680 (7th ed. 1997). 
 107. S. P. Sathe, Avoidance of Premature Constitutional Questions by the Supreme Court, 
in YEARBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 23, 23-47 (Madras ed., 1975).  
 108. Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149. 
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unnecessary and undesirable. Seervai said: “But this case also 
furnishes an example of extreme undesirability of a court 
pronouncing on large constitutional questions which do not directly 
arise.”109 
The Court, however, addressed the question of waiver of 
fundamental rights because it wanted to protect people from 
themselves. In a rights conscious society, the doctrine of waiver was 
quite proper because there is a level playing field between citizens, 
all with equal rights. However, in a society where rights had been 
given to people who had been powerless and exploited for 
generations, such waiver could be dangerous and could make the 
entire bill of rights meaningless. The rights were not mere individual 
entitlements; they constituted the societal commitment to a new 
social order and therefore could not be left to their assertion by the 
individuals for whose benefit they had been guaranteed. A proactive 
judicial process was a condition precedent to the enforcement of 
fundamental rights. 
C. Writ Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts 
The Constitution confers power on the Supreme Court under 
Article 32 and on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue writs 
and orders in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, 
prohibition, and quo warranto . The Supreme Court can issue these 
writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The High Courts can 
issue writs for enforcement of fundamental rights and for “any other 
purpose.”110 The Supreme Court held that “for any other purpose” 
meant for the enforcement of any statutory, as well as common law, 
right. Further, the Constitution is farsighted in its use of the phrase 
“in the nature of” because such a phrase liberates the Indian courts 
from the technical constraints with which the writs in England were 
hedged. In one of its earliest judgments, the Supreme Court made 
clear it would not stand on the formality of the petitioner having 
asked for a specific remedy. If the petitioner establishes a violation of 
his rights, the court will issue an appropriate remedy, irrespective of 
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what remedy has been requested.111 The Constitution uses the words 
“in the nature of” by analogy to English writs. Indian courts can issue 
directions, orders, and writs other than prerogative writs. This helps 
the Indian courts to mold relief to meet the peculiar requirements of 
this country. It leaves to the courts a good deal of flexibility to deal 
with the problems at hand. It enabled courts in India to use private 
law remedies of injunction and stay orders given by the Code of Civil 
Procedure in the discharge of its public law function.112 Process 
activism was therefore inherent in the provisions of the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court’s observations of the Indian Constitution are 
broader than the prerogative writs in England. 
Although the Constitution does not expressly say so, the Indian 
courts have made a distinction between the issuance of writs for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights and the issuance of writs for other 
purposes. The courts insist that the applicant exhausts alternative 
remedies before coming to court with a request for a writ “for other 
purposes.” 
D. Delay: Grounds For Refusal of Judicial Review 
Although Article 32 confers a fundamental right to move the 
Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights, the 
Supreme Court held that such a right is not absolute. A person can 
lose this right if its assertion comes to court too late.113 This decision 
was severely criticized in academic writings.114 The law of limitation 
applies to ordinary suits and its purpose is to give finality to 
transactions. It is premised on the principle that no one should lose 
sleep over his rights and no person should be kept in indefinite 
uncertainty about his legal position. Although the law of limitation is 
not applicable to writ jurisdiction, courts have held that one must 
come to court for enforcement of his right within a reasonable period. 
 
 111. T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 440. 
 112. See Sathe, supra note 107, at 353-55. 
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However, in Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi v. the Speaker,115 the Court 
held that where public interest is involved, a court should hesitate to 
reject an application for a writ of quo warranto on the ground of 
delay. The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, inserted by the Fifty-
Second Amendment, contains provisions against the defection of a 
member of the legislature from one party to another. Under the 
Schedule, defection is defined as occurring when a member of the 
legislature incurs such disqualification rendered by the Speaker. The 
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly gave a ruling disqualifying 
certain legislators from membership on the ground of defection. 
Subsequently, the Speaker was removed and the Deputy Speaker 
acted as Speaker. In his capacity as Speaker, the Deputy Speaker 
reviewed the decision given by his predecessor and held that the 
members had not incurred such disqualification. A petition against 
the decision of the Deputy Speaker was made by Dr. Jalmi eight 
months after that decision. The High Court rejected the petition on 
the ground of delay. On appeal, the Supreme Court, held that the 
petition was not barred. 
Justice J.S. Verma surveyed the case law on the subject and found 
that all of the decisions where petitions were rejected on the ground 
of delay were those in which enforcement of a personal right was 
sought. These decisions did not relate to the assertion of the right of 
the people against illegal occupation of a public office. The relief 
claimed in the instant case was not of any personal benefit to the 
petitioner, but rather a vacation of a public office held illegally by 
certain persons. Justice Verma pointed out that the principle of laches 
as a ground for dismissing a petition is based on the sound policy of 
protecting the public interest. Where, however, not entertaining a 
petition caused greater harm to the public interest than the harm 
caused by the entertainment of a delayed petition, the petition must 
be entertained. Therefore, a petition would not be thrown out on the 
ground of delay if the petitioner could prove that the perpetuation of 
an illegal occupation of public office would cause greater harm to the 
public interest than the harm caused by the entertainment of the 
delayed petition. When a person occupies a public office illegally, a 
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petition seeking quo warranto against him is not in the interest of any 
individual, but is in the interest of the general public. Delay is a valid 
ground when an individual asserts this right against another 
individual, but it may not be a relevant ground for rejecting a petition 
when the public interest in occupation of a public office by the 
correct person is involved. A person who has illegally occupied such 
an office would benefit from the Court’s refusal to entertain the 
petition on the ground of delay. Therefore, when a writ is sought for 
preventing an illegal occupation of public office, delay will not bar 
the petition. 
The above case was the result of the recent jurisprudence of public 
interest litigation that had developed and the Court’s newly 
developed paradigm of judicial process, which was consistent with 
the rights discourse it generated through judicial activism. The new 
paradigm envisions an affirmative, proactive role of the Court in 
facilitating access to justice for those who do not possess either 
knowledge or resources for invoking the judicial process on their own 
behalf, and in ensuring greater public participation in the judicial 
umpiring of the constitutional government. The new paradigm was 
for a court which had to protect the rights of the poor and illiterate of 
India and to ensure that the rule of law was observed by citizens, as 
well as rulers. The doctrinal activism the Court had developed needed 
support from procedural activism. Such activism sought: (1) the 
redressal of grievances of victimized sections of society brought 
within the purview of the Court; (2) procedural innovations with a 
view toward making justice informal, cheap, and expeditious; and (3) 
a more participatory, polycentric, and result oriented judicial process. 
E. Locus Standi 
One of the important methods by which courts saved themselves 
from spurious or vicarious litigation was by determining whether the 
person who petitioned the Court had locus standi to do so. So, who 
has the locus standi? Litigants must show that they are adversely 
affected by the impugned action or that their rights have been 
violated. Further, the issue raised must be a justiciable issue; an issue 
capable of resolution through the judicial process. This rule of private 
law adjudication is also applicable to public law adjudication. The 
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only exception is in the case of the writ of habeas corpus. This writ is 
issued to liberate a person from illegal detention. It may happen that 
the person held in such illegal detention is not in a position to move 
the court and therefore a stranger or the next friend is given locus 
standi to move the court for such a writ. Such a stranger or next 
friend may trigger the judicial process after showing that the 
impugned action or law resulted in denial of a person’s liberty. 
The rule of locus standi is based on sound policy. However, it 
presupposes that people are conscious of their rights and have the 
resources to fight against the violations of those rights. Even in 
England, the rule of locus standi has widened to allow persons with 
“sufficient interest” to challenge the government action. When the 
rules of locus standi, conceived for a more efficient functioning of 
the judicial process, inhibited genuine claims from reaching the 
courts, exceptions to the rule became necessary. According to S. A. 
de Smith: 
All developed legal systems have had to face the problems of 
adjusting conflicts between two aspects of the public interest- 
the desirability of encouraging individual citizens to participate 
actively in the enforcement of the law, and the undesirability 
of encouraging the professional litigant and the meddlesome 
interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in matters that 
do not concern him.116 
If public duties are to be enforced, and the public interest subserved 
by the enforcement of such public duties is to be protected, public -
spirited persons or organizations must be allowed to move the courts 
and act in furtherance of the group interest even though they may not 
be directly injured in their own rights or interests. Both the United 
States and the United Kingdom have adopted this liberal view of 
locus standi.  
The Supreme Court of India is the protector and guarantor of the 
fundamental rights of the people of India, the majority of whom are 
ignorant and poor. The liberalization of the rule of locus standi arose 
from the following considerations: (1) to enable the Court to reach 
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the poor and disadvantaged sections of society who are denied their 
rights and entitlements; (2) to enable individuals or groups of people 
to raise matters of common concern arising from dishonest or 
inefficient governance; and (3) to increase public participation in the 
process of constitutional adjudication. This litigation came to be 
known as public interest litigation (PIL). PIL is, actually, a misnomer 
because all public law litigation is inspired by public interest. In fact, 
even private adjudication subserves public interest because it is out of 
public interest that people should honor contracts, should be liable for 
civil wrongs, and should honor rights in property or status. Whereas 
public interest is served indirectly by private litigation because the 
main focus is on the private interest of the litigants, public interest is 
served more directly by public law adjudication because the focus is 
on the unconstitutionality arising from either lack of power or 
inconsistency with a constitutionally guaranteed right. Public interest 
litigation is a narrower form of public law litigation.  
The term public interest litigation is used in the United States, but 
public interest litigation in India differs from the American public 
interest litigation in substantial ways.117 Baxi pointed out that the 
American public interest litigation was funded by government and 
private foundations and its focus was not so much on state repression 
or government lawlessness as on public participation in governmental 
decision making. He therefore insisted that the Indian phenomenon 
described as PIL should be described as social action litigation 
(SAL).118 I am using the term PIL because of its acceptance and 
familiarity at the popular level. That term is now used in judgments 
of the courts and cells under that tit le have been set up in the 
Supreme Court as well as in various High Courts. The media also 
uses the term. PIL is different from the normal writ jurisdiction 
litigation in the following aspects: (1) the courts allow informality of 
procedure by entertaining letters written to judges or the court as 
petitions, or take cognizance of matters on their own (suo moto ) and 
substitute inquisitorial processes in place of the adversary processes 
wherever necessary for the disposal of a matter; (2) the rules of locus 
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standi, meaning the rules regarding the eligibility of a person to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the courts, are relaxed; and (3) new reliefs 
and remedies are developed to do justice. In addition, PIL brought 
about a radical metamorphosis in the nature of the judicial process, 
imbibing in it polycentric, as well as legislative, characteristics. The 
conceptual difference between public law litigation, meaning 
constitutional law and administrative law litigation, and public 
interest litigation will be explained la ter after fully describing the 
evolution of the latter. 
In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, the Court responded to a 
letter written by Sunil Batra, a prison inmate, drawing attention to the 
miserable lot of a fellow prisoner who was subjected to unbearable 
physical torture by the prison authorities.119 Batra scribbled the letter 
on a piece of paper and sent it to Justice Krishna Iyer of the Supreme 
Court. Justice Iyer responded to the letter, and from his response 
emerged the first judicial discourse on prisoners’ rights.120 On the 
other hand, while dealing with a petition filed by Advocate Kapila 
Hingorani regarding inordinately long periods of pre-trial detention 
suffered by some accused criminals, Justice Bhagwati obtained 
information about a large number of other people suffering from 
similarly long detention periods. These periods sometimes far 
exceeded the longest amount of imprisonment prescribed as 
punishment for the charged offense. Justice Bhagwati addressed the 
issue of pre-trial detention in Hussainara Khatoon v. Bihar.121 The 
Hussainara Court held that the right to a speedy trial was covered 
under the procedure established by Article 21 of the Constitution and 
gave directions to courts and the governments regarding how to 
expedite trials. 
Since then, several prisoners have written letters to individual 
judges, who in turn inquired into the matter. Because such prisoners 
rarely possess legal expertise, the facts in the letters require 
verification. Commissioners may be appointed to investigate the facts 
on behalf of the prisoners and submit reports to the Court. Such 
innovations in procedures were justified by Justice Bhagwati in 
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Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. India.122 First, Justice Bhagwati explained 
the liberal rule of standing that the Court had articulated: 
There is no limitation in the words of clause (1) of Article 32 
that the fundamental right which is sought to be enforced by 
moving the Supreme Court should be one belonging to the 
person who moves the Supreme Court nor does it say that the 
Supreme Court should be moved only by a particular kind of 
proceeding. 123 
Justice Bhagwati observed that wherever there was a violation of 
a fundamental right, any person could move the Supreme Court for 
the enforcement of such fundamental right. This was, however, 
qualified by the Court: 
Of course, the Court would not, in exercise of its discretion, 
intervene at the instance of a meddlesome interloper or 
busybody and would ordinarily insist that only a person whose 
fundamental right is violated should be allowed to activise the 
Court.124 
Although this was the rule, exceptions were needed when actual 
victims required exceptions because they lacked either the knowledge 
of their rights or the resources for approaching the Court and some 
public-minded person or social action group moved the Court on their 
behalf. The Court could not close its doors to genuine complainants 
of violations of rights in order to keep “a meddlesome interloper” or a 
“busy body” out. Victims of oppression or exploitation may not be in 
a position to come to court on their own. They may be ignorant of 
their rights and ignorant of the remedy provided against denial of 
their rights. Therefore, another person motivated by altruistic 
considerations may approach the Court on behalf of the victim. 
How does such an altruistic person move the Court? The Court 
said that he could do so by writing a letter “because it would not be 
right or fair to expect a person acting pro bono publico to incur 
expenses out of his own pocket for going to a lawyer and preparing a 
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 123. Id. at 813. 
 124. Id. at 251. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/3
p 29 Sathe.doc  2/28/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001]  Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience 75 
 
 
regular writ petition for being filed.”125 Thus, the Court seems to have 
been influenced not only by the desire to provide access to 
underprivileged persons but also to de-professionalize the system of 
justice. Two reforms were undertaken: (1) to allow a public -minded 
person to move the court on behalf of the victims of injustice who are 
poor, illiterate, or socially and educationally underprivileged; and (2) 
to allow activation of the Court through a letter instead of a formal 
petition drafted by a lawyer. Public interest litigation was therefore 
seen as an instrument of bringing justice to the doorstep of the poor 
and less fortunate people. Justice Bhagwati said in P.U. D.R. v. India : 
We wish to point out with all the emphasis at our command 
that public interest litigation which is a strategic arm of the 
legal aid movement and which is intended to bring justice 
within the reach of the poor masses, who constitute the low 
visibility area of humanity is a totally different kind of 
litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation which is 
essentially of an adversarial character where there is a dispute 
between two litigating parties, one making claim or seeking 
relief against the other and that other opposing such claim or 
resisting such relief. Public interest litigation is brought before 
the Court not for the purpose of enforcing the rights of one 
individual against another as happens in the case of ordinary 
litigation, but is intended to promote and vindicate public 
interest which demands that violations of constitutional or 
legal rights of large number of people who are poor, ignorant 
or in a socially or economically disadvantaged position should 
not go unnoticed and unredressed.126 
The Court observed that the court systems do not exist to serve only 
the rich, but also to serve the poor. It was only the privileged who 
had, so far, held the key to the doors of justice. For the first time, the 
“portals of the Court are being thrown open to the poor and the 
downtrodden.”127 In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. India ,128 Justice 
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Bhagwati pointed out that Article 32, Clause (2) required the Court to 
enforce the fundamental rights through “appropriate proceedings,” 
proceedings that meet the ends of justice. Justice Bhagwati further 
stated how the procedural innovations that the Court adopted made 
justice more meaningful. He said: 
It is not at all obligatory that an adversarial procedure, where 
each party produces his own evidence tested by cross 
examination by the other side and the judge sits like an umpire 
and decides the case only on the basis of such material as may 
be produced before him by both parties, must be followed in a 
proceedings under article 32 for enforcement of fundamental 
right. . . . (I)t may be noted that there is nothing sacrosanct 
about the adversarial procedure.129 
On letter petitions as well as locus standi, R.S. Pathak in Bandhua 
Mukti Morcha v. Bihar forcefully addressed another viewpoint.  
Regarding letter petitions, he said: 
I see grave danger inherent in a practice where a mere letter is 
entertained as a petition from a person whose antecedents and 
status are unknown or so uncertain that no sense of 
responsibility can, without anything more, be attributed to the 
communication. There is good reason for the insistence on a 
document being set out in a form, or accompanied by evidence, 
indicating that the allegations made in it are made with a sense 
of responsibility by a person who has taken due care and 
caution to verify those allegations before making them.130 
Justice Pathak was apprehensive that an unverified 
communication received by the Court through the post might have 
been employed mala fide, as an instrument of coercion or blackmail 
against a person who holds a position of honor and respect in 
society.131 He warned that the Court’s judicial process should not be 
abused, and that it is necessary to follow formalities that ensure the 
extraordinary remedy provided by the Constitution is not used to 
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serve private partisan interests.  
Justice Sen said in his concurring judgment that letters should be 
addressed to the Court. The Court seldom entertained anonymous 
letters. In most cases the petitioner was a known social activist—
Sunil Batra132 or Vasudha Dhagamwar133—or an organization—
Bandhua Mukti Morcha134 or the Peoples Union for Democratic 
Rights.135 Further, Justice Sen said that letters should be addressed 
only to the Court generally and not to a specific judge. The practice 
of letters being addressed to individual judges was criticized. Letter 
petitions became rare and the Court appointed lawyers as amicus 
curie and asked them to draft a regular petition based on the letter. As 
a result, letters to individual judges also became rare. Questions 
regarding the validity of such informal procedures were referred from 
a two-judge bench comprised of Justice S.M. Fazl Ali and 
Ventkatramiah, to a larger bench for consideration.136 The larger 
bench, however, never addressed the matter, perhaps because those 
questions had become academic. 
When the Justices spoke against the adversary procedure, they did 
not foresee that any evidence would be believed without giving the 
opposing party an opportunity to respond. To that extent, the 
adversary procedure could not be eliminated. However, what the 
courts expected from the respondent, which was the state in most of 
the cases, was that instead of taking an adversarial position and 
merely denying the allegation, the respondent should help the court to 
find the truth. The litigation was not against the respondent but 
against the illegalities committed on its behalf. The state would 
benefit from such judicial inquiries because the state would know 
what it was lacking in administration and would be able to improve 
performance. In this sense Justice Bhagwati said, in P.U.D.R. v. 
India , that it was not an adversarial proceeding: 
Public interest litigation, as we conceive it is essentially a co-
operative or collaborative effort on the part of the petitioner, 
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the State or public authority and the court to secure observance 
of the constitutional or legal rights, benefits and privileges 
conferred upon the vulnerable sections of the community and 
to reach social justice to them. The State or public authority 
against whom public interest litigation is brought should be as 
much interested in ensuring basic human rights, constitutional 
as well as legal, to those who are in a socially and 
economically disadvantaged position, as the petitioner who 
brings the public interest litigation before the court.137 
Further, the commissioners’ reports are open to cross-examination 
by the respondents. They help the Court form a prima facie opinion. 
The Supreme Court is careful to appoint responsible persons as 
commissioners.138 In public interest litigation, the Court has not 
intended the judges to take a neutral position as in adversary 
litigation, but to examine complaints of violations of human rights, 
subversion of the rule of law, or disregard of environment with 
greater care and through a proactive inquiry. They need not wait for 
the petitioner to prove everything letting the respondent take recourse 
to mere denials as is done in the adversary proceedings, but can order 
investigations and employ inquisitorial methods for finding the truth. 
A good example of such cooperative or collaborative effort is the 
decision in Azad Riksha Pullers Union v. Punjab.139 The Punjab 
Cycle Riksha, or Regulation of Rikshaws Act of 1975, provided that 
licenses to ply rikshaws could be given only to those owners who run 
the rikshaws. Licenses could not be given to those who owned the 
rikshaw but rented them to other persons. This Act threatened the 
unemployment of a number of rikshaw pullers who did not own their 
rikshaws, and threatened to leave many rikshaws owned by the non-
driving owners idle. The Act was challenged on the ground that it 
would affect the right to carry on any trade, business, or occupation 
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Justice Iyer, 
instead of striking down the law, provided a scheme whereby the 
rikshaw pullers could obtain loans from the Punjab National Bank to 
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 139. Azad Riksha Pullers Union v. Punjab, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 14. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/3
p 29 Sathe.doc  2/28/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001]  Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience 79 
 
 
acquire the rikshaws. The plan provided for the repayment of the loan 
over a period of time. The intention of the legislature to abolish the 
practice of renting the rikshaws from the owners was achieved 
without causing any suffering to the rikshaw pullers. 
The liberal rule of locus standi helped the social action groups 
come to court on behalf of the underprivileged sections of society. 
Groups like Peoples Union For Civil Liberties, Peoples Union for 
Democratic Rights, Bandhua Mukti Morcha, Akhil Bharatiya Shoshit 
Karmachari Sangh, Banwasi Sewa Ashram and the Common Cause 
(a registered society), and individuals like M.C. Mehta, Sheela Barse, 
Sivsagar Tiwari Upendra Baxi had standing to move the Court on 
behalf of underprivileged people. Similarly, victims such as pre-trial 
prisoners,140 prison inmates,141 unorganized labor,142 bonded labor,143 
pavement dwellers,144 children prosecuted under the Juvenile Justice 
Act,145 children of prostitutes,146 and women in protective custody147 
received the Court’s attention. Public interest litigation of the late 
1970s and the early 1980s was dominated by petitions on behalf of 
oppressed people denied their human rights. The Court’s liberal 
interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution included human rights 
within the scope of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution. The liberal rules of access from which public interest 
litigation emanated enabled the courts to reach victims of injustice, 
who had until then been invisible. The procedural activism 
complemented the substantive activism previously surveyed in this 
Article.148 
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F. Concept of Justiciability Extended 
The PILs, raising the question of governance, asked the courts to 
compel the government to do its duty or to prevent the government 
from doing what it was legally forbidden to do. This is the function of 
the writ of mandamus. The difference between the traditional 
mandamus and the mandamus under PIL is that under PIL, the scope 
of mandamus increased. Mandamus was issued under traditional 
administrative law only to compel the state or a public authority to do 
what it was legally bound to do. If discretion was involved, the Court 
could not issue a writ of mandamus. Under PIL, however, mandamus 
is issued to mandate acts within the discretionary power of the 
government that do not fall within the purview of the traditional writ 
of mandamus. For example, mandamus was issued when the 
petitioner alleged a violation of human rights the CBI should 
investigate,149 or when a petition sought directions from the Court to 
trust the CBI to inquire into the sexual exploitation of children and 
the flesh trade.150 Mandamus was also issued when government 
hospitals failed to provide timely emergency medical treatment to 
persons in need, violating their right to life,151 or when petitions 
against the management of hospitals for mental diseases had failed.152 
Mandamus was issued with petitions seeking to enforce public health 
and safety measures against municipal corporations,153 petitions 
against non-functioning medical equipment in government 
hospitals,154 and petitions against the mosquito menace that 
jeopardized the right to life.155 A petition asking for education of the 
children of prostitutes156 and a petition impugning a provision in the 
Jail Manual, that provided the body of an executed convict be 
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 150. Vishal Jeet v. India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1412. 
 151. P. B Khet Mazdoor Samity v. West Bengal, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2426. 
 152. S. R. Kapoor v. India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 752; B. R. Kapur v. India, (1989) 3 S.C.C. 
387; Rakesh Chandra v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 348; Ra Kesh Chandra v. Birha, A.I.R. 1995 
S.C. 208. 
 153. K. C. Malhotra v. M. P., A.I.R. 1994 M.P. 48. 
 154. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. India, A.I.R. 1997 Del. 395. 
 155. India v. S. J. Pandit, A.I.R. 1997 Ker. 152. 
 156. Gourav Jain v. India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3021. 
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suspended for half an hour after death, on the ground that it violated 
the right to dignity included in the right to personal liberty.157 Both 
responded with suitable mandamus and other orders. Petitions for 
improving the conditions of service of the members of the 
subordinate judicial service,158 for filling vacancies of the judges of 
the Supreme Court and the High Courts,159 for seeking a ban against 
judges taking up post retirement jobs in government or politics,160 
and for seeking directions from the Court to expedite the disposal of 
pending cases so as to reduce the period of pre-trial detention161 are 
examples of PILS in judicial matters. Other examples include a 
petition by a Bar Association seeking contempt proceedings against 
the police for patronizing an organized political party162 and a petition 
seeking permission of the Court to allow non-lawyers to appear in 
court during a lawyers’ strike.163 Wadhwa could raise questions under 
PIL about re-promulgation of the ordinances.164 Common Cause, a 
registered society founded by Mr. H.D. Shourie, could raise questions 
about blood transfusions,165 arrears in courts,166 appointment of 
consumer courts,167 and abuse of distribution power, as in the case of 
petrol pumps.168 Shiv Sagar Tiwari could raise a question about 
arbitrary allotments of houses.169 Finally, Vineet Narain could obtain 
orders from the Court to the CBI to fairly and properly conduct and 
complete investigations into alleged acts of corruption and breach of 
foreign exchange and to report to itself regarding the investigation.170 
He could also, by another petition, obtain directions as to how the 
 
 157. Pt. Parmanand Katara, Advocate v. Union of India, (1995) 3 S.C.C. 248. 
 158. All India Judges Association v. India, (1998) 2 S.C.C. 204.  
 159. Subhash Sharma v. India,  A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 631. 
 160. Nixon M. Joseph v. India, A.I.R. 1998 Ker. 385. 
 161. Common Cause, a Registered society v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1619; 
Common Cause, a registered Society v. Union of India. A.I.R. 1997 (Supp.) S.C. 1539. 
 162. Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of U. P., (1995) Supp. (3) S.C.C. 602. 
 163. Common Cause, a Registered society v. Union of India, (1994) 5 S.C.C. 557. 
 164. D.C. Wadhwa v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 569. 
 165. Common Cause, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. at 929. 
 166. Common Cause, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. at 1619; Common Cause v. India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 
(Supp.) 1539. 
 167. Common Cause, a Registered society v. Union of India, (1992) 1 S.C.C. 707.  
 168. Common Cause, a Registered society v. Union India, (1996) 6 S.C.C. 530.  
 169. Shivsagar Tiwari v. Union of India, (1996) 6 S.C.C. 558.  
 170. Vineet Narain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 3386. 
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CBI could be reorganized so as to ensure its independence as an 
investigation agency.171 The Court took up the work of monitoring 
the investigation of corruption cases since the CBI and the revenue 
authorities had failed to investigate matters arising out of seizure of 
the Jain diaries, which contained detailed accounts of vast payments 
made to various high-ranking politicians. Chief Justice Verma, 
speaking for the Court, observed that “none stands above the law”172 
and that monitoring must be done so that the investigation progressed 
while ensuring that the Court did not direct or channel those 
investigations or in any manner prejudice the right of those accused 
to a full and fair trial. The Court made it clear that it took over 
monitoring only because the superiors to whom the investigating 
authorities were supposed to report were themselves involved or 
suspected to be involved in the crimes. The Court called this a 
continuing mandamus. A similar continuing mandamus was issued in 
the Fodder Scam case in Bihar. The Court issued guidelines detailing 
how, and to whom, the CBI authorities should report offenses under 
investigation.173 A petition was filed by a member of Parliament in 
conjunction with NGOs prayers for disclosure of the Vohra 
committee’s report on corruption. 174 
The Court addressed PILs complaining of non-implementation of 
a ban imposed by the Drugs and Cosmetics Act of 1940 on the 
import, manufacture, and sale of certain drugs.175 The Court also 
considered the inadequacy of safety precautions in the army’s 
ammunition test firing range near Itarsi in M.P., which resulted in the 
death of tribal people who strayed onto the range to collect metal 
scraps of ammunition. 176 Other debated issues include the shortage of 
hazardous and non-hazardous chemicals,177 inhumane working 
conditions in stone quarries,178 and serious deficiencies in the matter 
 
 171. Vineet Narain et al. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 889.  
 172. Id. at 896. 
 173. Union of India, v. Sushil Kumar Modi, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 314. 
 174. Dinesh Trivedi, M. P. v. India, (1997) 4 S.C.C. 306. 
 175. Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 990.  
 176. Sudipt Mazumdar v. State of M.P., (1996) 5 S.C.C. 368. 
 177. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 965. 
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of collection, storage, and supply of blood by blood banks.179 
The Communist Party of India appealed the decision of the Kerala 
High Court180 regarding a writ petition filed by a citizen. The High 
Court held that the bandh, organized to close down all business on a 
particular day and enforced through coercion, violated the right to 
freedom of movement guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d) and the right to 
personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Kerala High Court.181 
Another petition contended that demonstrations and processions 
conducted in the city area caused obstruction of pedestrians’ free 
movement and vehicular traffic.182 In another petition it was alleged 
that the government failed to take action against those responsible for 
the communal riots held in Mumbai in December, 1992 and 
February, 1993. The Court did not find substance in these 
allegations.183 
Other petitions were successful, including petitions seeking 
improvement in the management and control of road traffic,184 
petitions while successfully made for the construction of a new 
bridge, bridge formed the lifeline for villagers; replacing of a wooden 
bridge that collapsed due to the negligence of the authorities; the 
provision of separate schools with vocational training; and the 
provision of hostels with regular medical check-ups for the children 
of lepers.185 In M.C. Mehta v. India ,186 the Court asked the 
Government of India and the Government of U.P. to file an affidavit 
explaining why a large part of the toll tax and the visitors fees 
received from tourists visiting the Taj Mahal should go to the Agra 
Development Authority, when the money logically should have been 
spent on the preservation of the Taj Mahal and cleaning the city of 
Agra. 
 
 179. Common Cause, a Registered society v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 929. 
 180. Bharat Kumar K. Palicha v. State, A.I.R. 1997 Ker. 291. 
 181. Communist Party of India v. Bharat Kumar, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 184. 
 182. Peoples Council For Social Justice, Ernaculam v. State, A.I.R. 1997 Ker. 309. 
 183. Committee For the Protection of Democratic Rights v. Chief Minister of State of 
Maharashtra, (1996) 11 S.C.C. 419. 
 184. M. C. Mehta v. India, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 186. 
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The Court held that employees of a private educational institution 
had standing to enforce their right to wages equal to the wages of 
employees of government institutions, because education is similarly 
a matter of public interest.187 Similarly, a petition to remove an 
advocate general188 and a petition challenging appointment of 
lecturers in a college189 were held admissible. A student council was 
held not to have standing to challenge the Vice Chancellor’s decision 
to allow certain students to appear for examination. Because the 
Court reasoned that the student council failed to show: (1) that it was 
authorized to file such litigation; (2) who or what granted such 
authorization; (3) whether the student council had sufficient funds to 
indulge in such litigation; and (4) what public purpose would be 
subserved by the suit.190 When liberalization of locus standi takes 
place on such a large scale, consistency is often a problem. Unequal 
application of the rules of locus standi and justiciability result from 
subjective, personal inclinations of judges or the circumstances under 
which the petitions are heard. 
G. Directions: A New Form of Judicial Legislation 
Article 32 and Article 226 confer on the Supreme Court and the 
High Courts the power to issue “directions, orders or writs” for 
achieving the objectives of those articles. The courts have issued 
directions for varied purposes. In public interest litigation, the 
Supreme Court and the High Courts have issued directions for 
appointing committees or for asking the government to carry out a 
scheme. They may constitute specific orders to the parties to do or 
refrain from doing something.  
For example, directions in the Azad Riksha Pullers case191 asked 
 
 187. K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering, A.I.R. 
1998 S.C. 295. 
 188. Ponnuswamy v. Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1995 Madras 78. 
 189. Meera Massy v. S.R. Malhotra, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1153. The lecturers were challenged 
because they did not fulfill the qualifications prescribed by a professor of the same college who 
had no personal animosity again st those persons and who had a genuine interest in the standards 
of education. 
 190. Bhartiya Homeopathy College v. Students Council of Homeopathy Medical College, 
A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1110. 
 191. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 14. 
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the Punjab National Bank to advance loans to the rikshaw pullers and 
contained a whole scheme for the repayment of such loans. 
Directions in Common Cause v. India192 provided for how blood 
should be collected, stored, given for transfusion, and how blood 
transfusions could be made safe. Directions were given to the 
government to disseminate knowledge about the environment 
through slides in cinema theaters or special lessons in schools and 
colleges.193 The Supreme Court gave directions as to how children of 
prostitutes should be educated;194 what the fee structure in private 
medical or engineering colleges should be;195 preparing a scheme for 
the housing of pavement dwellers or squatters;196 and how the CBI 
should be insulated from extraneous influences while  conducting 
investigations against persons holding high offices.197 When contract 
labor workers in the Food Corporation of India sought an extension 
of the Contract Labor Regulation and Abolition Act of 1970, the 
Court directed the concerned governments to organize committees, to 
make the necessary inquiries and to submit reports as to whether 
contract labor should be abolished in those corporations.198  
In another case,199 the Court was asked to conduct an inquiry into 
police officers of red light areas, and to remove all victims from the 
flesh trade and provide them with remedies. The Court could not 
undertake such a roving inquiry, but gave directions to the 
government. In Kishen v. State of Orissa, the Supreme Court gave 
directions to the government regarding measures to be taken for 
preventing deaths due to poverty and starvation.200 These directions 
were in the nature of specific orders from the Court to the 
government and were administrative in character. 
Some of these directions had legislative effect. Law making by the 
Supreme Court through directions has belied the legal theory 
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regarding ratio decidendi and obiter dictum. Generally, any legal 
principle that becomes the basis of a decision, without which decision 
could not have been rendered, is called ratio decidendi. Such a legal 
principle, or ratio, is binding on that court and on all courts 
subordinate to it in litigation involving similar questions. The ratio is 
the law laid down by the court and that alone is binding on 
subordinate courts in future litigation. Any legal principle that the 
court elucidates but that is not necessary for the disposal of the case 
will not enjoy the status of a ratio. Such extraneous judicial 
observations on principles of law are known as obiter dictum. The 
obiter dictum is merely of persuasive value. It may be cited by 
lawyers, but will become a binding precedent only if it is accepted by 
a court as a ratio in another case. While a decision is binding on the 
actual parties (res judicata), the ruling (ratio) is binding on the courts 
while deciding future cases. The doctrine of stare decisis means that 
every lower court is bound by the decisions of the higher court. This 
principle also applies to various benches of the Supreme Court. 
Therefore, a bench of higher-strength judges of the Supreme Court is 
consulted if a previous decision of a different bench is to be 
reconsidered. The doctrine of precedent means that a court is bound 
by its own previous decision and the lower courts are bound by the 
decision of a higher court. Article  141 of the Constitution says that 
the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be the law of the land. In 
terms of strict legal theory, only the ratio constitutes the binding law. 
Nevertheless, the High Courts have held that they are bound even by 
the obiter dicta  of the Supreme Court.201 The obiter dicta of the 
Supreme Court in Golaknath v. Punjab,202 stating that Parliament 
could not amend the Constitution so as to take away or abridge 
fundamental rights was not a ratio. The actual decision of the Court 
was that the impugned constitutional amendments forming the basis 
by which the petitioner’s properties in that case had been taken were 
valid. Since the Court had applied the doctrine of “prospective 
overruling,” all those constitutional amendments which the petitioner 
had challenged had been held to be valid. Thus, the actual Court’s 
 
 201. See M. P. JAIN,  INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 176 (N.M. Tripathi, 2d ed. 1970) 
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decision was not directly connected with the Court’s futuristic 
mandate that Parliament shall not amend the Constitution so as to 
take away or abridge fundamental rights. That mandate was to be 
applicable only in the future. Since the traditional legal theory of 
positivism did not conceive any law making function to be performed 
by the courts, such a futuristic mandate was preposterous. Therefore 
in strict positivist terms, the Golaknath dicta was not the law. In 
reality, though, it was treated as law, not only by the Court itself but 
also by Parliament. Parliament took steps to amend the Constitution 
to overturn that dicta. The Court held in Keshavananda Bharati203 
that the Golaknath dicta was wrong. 
The ratio-obiter distinction has become inconsequential in 
constitutional law litigation in general, and particularly in public 
interest litigation. In public interest litigation, the Court has begun 
legislating through issuing directions. These directions are overtly 
legislative and they are considered binding not only by the Supreme 
Court and lower courts, but also by the government and social action 
groups. In Laxmikant Pandey v. India204 the Supreme Court provided 
guidelines as to what procedures should be followed and what 
precautions should be taken when allowing the adoption of Indian 
children by foreign parents. There was no law to regulate inter-
country adoptions and such lack of legal regulation could cause 
incalculable harm to Indian children. Considering the possibility of 
child trade for prostitution as well as slave labor, legal regulation of 
such adoptions was essential. Therefore, Justice Bhagwati created a 
scheme for regulating both inter-country and intra-country adoptions. 
For the last twenty years, social activists have used these directions to 
protect children and promote desirable adoptions. 
IV. LEGITIMACY 
The Supreme Court of India has become the most powerful apex 
court in the world. Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, 
 
 203. Kesavanand Bharati v. Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. 
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the House of Lords in England, or the highest courts in Canada or 
Australia, the Supreme Court of India may review a constitutional 
amendment and strike it down if it undermines the basic structure of 
the Constitution. 205 The realist school of jurisprudence uncovered the 
myth that judges merely declare or interpret pre-existing law. The 
realist school of jurisprudence stated that judges make law and the 
law is what the courts say it is. This “legal skepticism” was a reaction 
to Austin’s definition of law as a command of the political sovereign. 
According to analytical jurisprudence, a court merely applies or 
interprets existing law. The American realist school of jurisprudence 
asserted that the judges made law, though interstitially. Jerome Frank, 
Justice Holmes, Justice Cardozo, and Justice Karl Llewellyn were the 
chief exponents of this school. 206 The Indian Supreme Court not only 
makes law, as understood in the sense of realist jurisprudence, but 
actually legislates. Judicial law making in the realist sense is what the 
Court does when it expands the meanings of the words “personal 
liberty,” “due process of law,” or “freedom of speech and 
expression.” 
The doctrine of separation of powers envisages that the legislature 
should make law, the executive should execute it, and the judiciary 
should settle disputes in accordance with the pre-existing law. In 
reality, this distinction is impractical and does not exist. Construed 
broadly it merely means that one body of the state should not perform 
a function that essentially belongs to another body. While law-
making through interpretation and expansion of the meaning of open 
textured expressions like “due process of law,” “equal protection of 
law,” or “freedom of speech and expression” is a legitimate judicial 
function, the Supreme Court’s creation of entirely new laws through 
directions, as in the above mentioned cases, is not a legitimate 
judicial function. 
After surveying Indian Supreme Court caselaw, we arrive at the 
conclusion that the Court has clearly transcended the limits of the 
judicial function and has undertaken functions which really belong to 
either the legislature or the executive. Its decisions clearly violate the 
limits imposed by the doctrine of separation of powers. A court is not 
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equipped with the skills and the competence to discharge functions 
that essentially belong to other coordinate bodies of government. Its 
institutional equipment is inadequate for undertaking legislative or 
administrative functions. It cannot create positive rights such as the 
right to work, the right to education, or the right to shelter. It does not 
have the equipment for monitoring the various steps that are required 
for the abolition of child labor. It cannot stop entirely the degradation 
of the environment or government lawlessness. Its actions in these 
areas are bound to be symbolic. Admitting all these aspects, 
therefore, judicial activism is welcomed not only by individuals and 
social activists, but also by the government and other political 
players, like the political parties and civil servants. None of the 
political players have protested against judicial intrusion into matters 
that essentially belonged to the executive. Some feeble whispers are 
heard, but they are from those whose vested interests are adversely 
affected. On the other hand, the political establishment is showing 
unusual deference to the decisions of the Court. Whether it is the 
limitation by the basic structure doctrine on Parliament’s constituent 
power under Article 368 of the Constitution, or the limitations upon 
the President’s power under Article 356,207 the political establishment 
has considered itself bound to function within the limits drawn by the 
Supreme Court. Generally, the people believe that the government 
and other authorities must abide by the decisions of the Court. The 
general population and political players believe that in matters 
involving conflict between various competing interests, the courts are 
better arbiters than politicians. And by political players, I mean not 
only the central and the state governments and political parties, but 
also various constitutional authorities such as the President, the 
Election Commission, the National Human Rights Commission, and 
the statutory authorities including the tribunals, commissions and 
regulatory agencies. 
 
 207. See S.R. Bommai v. India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918. Under Art icle 356 of the 
Constitution, the President can dismiss the government of the state when its charge is not 
carried out in accordance with the Constitution. Whether a government functions according to 
the constitution is a political question which had to be assessed by the President. In Bommai, 
the Supreme Court laid down legal parameters for judging the validity of the President’s 
actions. Despite such legal parameters, the decision of the Court is bound to be political.  
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A. Legitimacy: Conceptualization 
John Austin defined law as a command of the sovereign enforced 
through sanction. According to Austin, it is coercive power that 
distinguishes law from fashions, habits, or even customs. Austin did 
not make any distinction between good law and bad law. To him, 
even a bad law was law if it fulfilled the three characteristics of law: 
(1) it was a command; (2) it was issued by the sovereign authority; 
and (3) it was backed by a sanction. H.L.A. Hart, a critic of analytical 
jurisprudence, asks whether an order from a gunman demanding a 
bank teller to hand over his cash was law?208 The order of the 
gunman was also backed by a sanction, i.e., the fear of death. Was the 
gunman a sovereign? Austin defines sovereign as a person or 
authority that is subordinate to none and is obeyed by all. At the 
particular point of time when the gunman orders the bank teller to 
hand over the cash, he is obeyed by everyone who is under his threat 
and he is not required to obey anyone. The difference between the 
gunman and a political sovereign is that the gunman is not considered 
to be a lawful authority and his command is obeyed out of fear of 
death alone. According to Hart, the bank teller obeyed the gunman 
because he was “obliged” to do so. He did not have an obligation to 
obey. What is the difference between “being obliged to obey” and 
“having an obligation to obey?” The bank teller is obliged to obey but 
does not have an obligation to obey. Hart further says: 
It is, however, equally certain that we should misdescribe the 
situation if we said ‘on these facts’ that [the bank teller] ‘had 
an obligation’ or a ‘duty’ to hand over the money. So from the 
start it is clear that we need something else for an 
understanding of the idea of obligation. There is a difference, 
yet to be explained, between the assertion that someone was 
obliged to do something and the assertion that he had an 
obligation to do it.209 
A sovereign is considered to be a legitimate authority. A legitimate 
authority is one who is obeyed not only because one “is obliged to do 
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so” but also because one feels that he is “under an obligation to do 
so.” Professor Hart was a linguistic philosopher and by drawing a 
distinction between “being obliged to act” and “having an obligation 
to act,” he points out the difference between compliance with an 
order because of fear and compliance with an order because such an 
order is considered to be binding. 
A gunman is obeyed only because there is fear of death. A 
sovereign may also be obeyed because there is fear of punishment, 
but that punishment is considered to be prescribed by a legitimate 
authority. It is the “obligation to act” that arises from the legitimacy 
of an order. A sovereign that is appointed or elected by law is 
considered legitimate. Legal validity is a prerequisite to legitimacy. 
When we say that a law is valid, we mean that it is made by an 
authority competent to make it and that it is made in accordance with 
the procedure prescribed therefor.  
The difference between power and authority is similarly 
significant. The gunman has power, but no authority. The sovereign 
is supposed to have power and authority. Sometimes the sovereign 
lacks power, but possesses authority. For example, under the 
Constitution, the President of India has to act on the aid and advice of 
the Council of Ministers.210 The President has power to return the 
advice once but if the cabinet persists in giving that advice, he must 
accept it and act in accordance with it.211 Thus, the president may not 
have the power but he has the authority. The ultimate order must be 
in the name of the President; otherwise, it is not legitimate. 
According to Max Weber, the most common form of legitimacy is 
“the belief in legality, i.e., the acquiescence in enactments which are 
formally correct and which have been made in the accustomed 
manner.”212 While validity is essentially a legal concept, legitimacy is 
a sociological concept. Validity is determined in terms of legality and 
it is also a prerequisite of legitimacy. However, a law maybe valid 
and yet lack legitimacy. For example, when Gandhi refused to obey a 
law he considered unjust, he delegitimated the colonial law and 
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 212. MAX WEBER,  ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY  9 (Edward Shils & Max 
Rheinstein trans., Harvard University Press 1925). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 29 Sathe.doc  2/28/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 6:29 
 
 
sought to legitimize conscientious objection to an unjust law. 
Although the law was valid because it had been enacted by a 
competent authority, it was divested of its legitimacy in the eyes of a 
large number of Indians because of its unjust character. When Tilak 
was sentenced to six years of imprisonment for the offense of 
sedition, he stated that although he was guilty in a civil court, he was 
innocent in a higher court, a divine court. Unlike Gandhi, Tilak did 
not plead guilty to the charge of sedition but asserted that what he 
wrote or said did not amount to sedition. Gandhi’s approach was 
based on morality (natural law) whereas Tilak appealed to the 
concept of the rule of law—the basis of English law.213 Both, 
however, protested against the positive law which they saw as unjust. 
The justness of the law was determined by applying moral 
parameters. In legal theory, the concept of natural law has always 
acted as a moral scale for the evaluation of a positive law. Where a 
positive law manifestly runs counter to natural law, it loses its 
legitimacy. When German generals pleaded that they participated in 
the extermination of the Jews under orders of superiors given under 
valid German laws, the Nuremburg tribunal, set up by the Allies to 
try war criminals after the end of the Second World War, rejected 
that plea on the ground that their crimes against humanity could not 
be justified under any law. The tribunal therefore held that even a 
valid law could not give authority for such heinous crimes. The 
decision of the Nuremburg tribunal, though erroneous from the 
standpoint of legal positivism, was right according to a widely shared 
consensus which emerged after the War. That consensus lent 
legitimacy to the decision of the Nuremburg tribunal.  
In India, although the declaration of emergency in 1975 and the 
subsequent curbs on liberty imposed through various orders of the 
President were legally valid, they obviously lacked legitimacy in the 
eyes of those who felt they were excessive. This was evidenced from 
the fact that even Mrs. Gandhi herself was not sure of the legitimacy 
of the emergency regime and therefore wanted to secure legitimacy 
for her rule through the elections that she announced in 1977. 
Legitimacy therefore means: (1) legal validity; (2) a widely shared 
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feeling among the people that they have a duty to obey the law; and 
(3) actual obedience of the law by a large number of people. 
Gandhi’s passive resistance was based on challenging the latter two 
requirements. It was aimed at delegitimization of colonial law, which 
was unjust and unfair. At the same time, Gandhi avoided the growth 
of anarchy by volunteering to suffer punishment for his disobedience 
of the law. Submission to the punishment prescribed by the law 
tended to legitimate the rule of law, but also tended to delegitimate 
the colonial law. It also legitimated the right to peaceful protest 
against a law that was considered to be a bad law. 
B. The Emergency: A Watershed in Indian Politics 
The setting aside of the election of Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s election 
by the Allahabad High Court was an event of great significance. It 
established that no one was above the law. Although she had been at 
the height of popularity in 1971 after she won the war against 
Pakistan that resulted in the liberation of Bangladesh, public 
disillusionment caused by the disparity between the promise and the 
performance of her government had set in. Although she had 
humbled the old establishment, known as the Syndicate, the de-
ideologization of her party and the consequent increase in corruption 
had stirred public movement under the leadership of Jay Prakash 
Narain, a leader universally respected for his sacrifice and 
commitment. The decision of the Allahabad High Court gave further 
impetus to that agitation. There were demands that she should resign 
as Prime Minister. She had obtained a stay order from the Supreme 
Court, while again appealing the decision of the Allahabad High 
Court.214 Mrs. Gandhi might have won the appeal because the 
Allahabad decision was based on technical illegality rather than 
substantive illegality. Nani Palkhivala, who had argued successfully 
against her government in the Kesavanand Bharati, Bank 
Nationalization, and Privy Purses Cases represented Mrs. Gandhi in 
the Supreme Court, where Justice Iyer granted her stay. Mrs. Gandhi, 
however, chose not to face the uncertainty of how the Supreme Court 
would finally decide her appeal. She had the Constitution amended to 
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make her election valid despite any judicial decision. The Thirty-
Ninth Amendment of 1975 conferred validity on Mrs. Ghandi’s 
election, notwithstanding the decision of any court to the contrary. 
The Supreme Court struck down that clause of the Thirty-Ninth 
Amendment as being violative of the basic structure of the 
Constitution.215  
On June 25, 1975 the Gandhi government advised the President to 
declare emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution. Actually, an 
earlier proclamation of emergency made under that Article in 1971, 
during the war with Pakistan, had yet not been withdrawn. The 
second emergency was superimposed over the earlier emergency, the 
latter for combating internal disorder whereas the former was for 
confronting the threat of external aggression. During the second 
emergency, sweeping restrictions on individual liberty were imposed, 
which had not been imposed under the previous two emergencies. All 
the leaders of the opposition were arrested and imprisoned. Judic ial 
review was severely restricted under various orders of the President 
issued under Article 359 of the Constitution and strict censorship was 
imposed on the press. 
The Supreme Court struggled to keep itself alive and sustain the 
people’s faith. In Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain ,216 it was faced with 
three options. It could: (1) strike down the constitutional amendment 
and affirm the Allahabad High Court’s judgment setting aside Mrs. 
Gandhi’s election; or (2) uphold the constitutional amendment and 
the election of Mrs. Gandhi; or (3) strike down the amendment, but 
uphold the election of Mrs. Gandhi. The Court must have weighed 
the pros and cons of all the above options. Had the Court chosen the 
first option, it would have invited severe confrontation with the 
political establishment. The judges could not rule out the possibility 
of the Parliament considerably reducing the Court’s power. Had the 
Court chosen the second option, it would have suffered in terms of 
public esteem. For an ordinary person, it would have appeared that 
the Court had completely surrendered itself before the hegemonic 
executive. Thus, the Court chose the third option, helping it save its 
power of judicial review over constitutional amendments while 
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avoiding immediate confrontation with the executive. The time of 
this decision was described by Seervai as the finest hour in the life of 
the Supreme Court.217 But what it managed to save in Indira Gandhi 
v. Raj Narain , it lost in A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla .218 
The end of the emergency, marked by the defeat of the Gandhi 
government and the rise of the Janata government, commenced the 
restoration of the Constitution to its pre-emergency position. The 
movement against emergency emphasized the sanctity of the 
Constitution and the rule of law. The anti-emergency discourse also 
included pro-Constitutional and pro-judicial review discourse. While 
criticizing the Supreme Court for its decision in A.D.M. Jabalpur v. 
Shivakant Shukla , the anti-emergency discourse emphasized that the 
power of declaring emergencies and the power of suspending judicial 
review, must be circumscribed by adequate safeguards and the 
independence of the judges must be established. Anti-emergency 
discourse legitimized the Constitution and condemned the 
constitutional amendments enacted during the emergency.219 It was 
during the emergency that a consensus in favor of judicial review and 
the basic structure limitation upon Parliament’s power of 
constitutional amendment emerged.220 The Gandhi government had 
passed several amendments to the Constitution during the emergency. 
Some of these amendments changed the face of the Constitution. The 
Janata government promised to restore the Constitution to its original 
position. Almost all the opposition parties, even those who had been 
critical of the Constitution, rallied around the Constitution and vowed 
to protect it. The emergency’s net gain was the legitimization of the 
Constitution. Although the Court had let down the cause of individual 
liberty in the Jabalpur case, the people generally believed that 
judicial review by an independent court was desirable for democracy. 
The Jabalpur decision was attributed to the panic psychosis created 
by the emergency and now there was greater support for judicial 
review by an independent judiciary. The basic structure doctrine that 
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lacked support in 1973 acquired greater legitimacy because the 
emergency had revealed how the Constitution could be prey to the 
whim of a partisan majority. After the Supreme Court asserted the 
power to review a constitutional amendment in Minerva Mills v. 
India,221 even the Gandhi government, which came to rule after the 
collapse of the Janata government, did not make any renewed effort 
to restore unlimited constituent power to Parliament. 
C. The Return of Indira Gandhi Rule and the Expansion of Judicial 
Activism 
The Supreme Court started its activism in 1978 and by the time 
the Gandhi government regained power, the Court had acquired the 
support of the people. The Court had started taking cudgels on behalf 
of the underprivileged, such as pre-trial prisoners,222 prison 
inmates,223 and accused criminals.224 During the Gandhi 
government’s tenure, the Court expanded its reach to unorganized 
labor,225 and, in 1982, challenged the Gandhi government’s attempt to 
transfer judges or appoint judges based on ulterior considerations. 
The Judges’ case226 was a clear declaration by the Court that it would 
address issues of governance, like independence of the judiciary, and 
reinterpret the existing laws so as to impose curbs on the power of the 
government. The Judges’ case was significant not only for 
liberalizing the rule of locus standi but also for circumscribing the 
government’s privilege to withhold disclosure of documents. The 
Indian Evidence Act gave the government the power to withhold 
disclosure of documents when disclosure, in its opinion, was against 
public interest. In previous decisions the Supreme Court had held that 
when the government claimed such a privilege, the only thing that a 
court could inquire was whether the matter contained in the document 
was related to the affairs of the state. The question whether disclosure 
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of documents was in the public interest was not for the courts to 
decide.227 In the Judges’ case, the Court held that when a claim for 
such privilege was made, the Court could have the document in 
question brought before it and could examine it in camera and decide 
whether disclosure would harm the public interest. The Court also 
declared that the people had the right to information. The Court had 
linked the right to information with the right to freedom of speech 
and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a).  
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Bihar,228 the Court claimed the right 
to oversee the implementation of beneficial legislation which sought 
to abolish bonded labor. Though constitutiona lly forbidden, the 
practice survived because of inaction on the part of Parliament and 
the government.229 Notably, during the emergency, the Court had 
started its activism on matters like legal aid and the abolition of 
bonded labor that were part of the twenty-point program of the 
emergency regime. The emergency regime seems to have been 
suffering from a guilt complex for imposing authoritarian order on 
the people. In an attempt to overcome that feeling, the emergency 
regime enacted, various progressive laws such as the Civil Rights Act 
of 1955, replacing the Untouchability Offences Act, the Bonded 
Labor Act of 1976, and the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act 
of 1976. The Court began its activism with issues that the emergency 
regime had included on its agenda. When the Court took up these 
issues, it could no longer be said that the Court was the protector of 
property owners or that the Court came in the way of social change. 
Now the equation was reversed. The Court started insisting on the 
actual implementation of the social reforms that the executive had 
initiated through the above legislation. The government seemed to be 
on the defensive, but it could not blame the Court because the Court 
merely asked government to do what it had promised to do through 
its legislation. It was after such activism had stabilized that the Court 
turned its attention to issues of governance such as the transfer and 
appointment of judges. 
During its post-emergency tenure, the Gandhi government 
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remained preoccupied with terrorism in Punjab and did not have time 
to take issue with the Court on matters such as the appointment and 
transfer of judges. Moreover, the Court had already given the 
government a free hand in appointing judges. The only limitation was 
that the government had to consult the Chief Justice of India. The 
Court spent a lot of ink on what it meant by meaningful consultation. 
The net effect was that after performing the formality of consultation, 
the government had the final say in the matter. The Judges case230 
was an accommodation sought by the Court with the government. 
While it made new law on various matters such as locus standi and 
government’s privilege to withhold disclosure of documents, on the 
main subject of appointment of the judges it gave the final say to the 
government. Perhaps the Court knew how far to go and where to 
stop. In saying that the opinion of the Chief Justice was only one of 
the other opinions to be sought by the government, the majority had 
clearly trivialized the office of the Chief Justice. While giving final 
say to the government in the appointment of the judges, the Court 
made the power of judicial appointment subject to judicial review on 
the limited grounds of whether the government had followed the 
procedures required by Article 124 or Article 217. The Court could 
examine whether the government had meaningfully consulted the 
Chief Justice and other judges, but the final decision after such 
consultation belonged to the government. Even this little dent that the 
Court made in the power of judicial appointments must have been 
disliked by the political establishment. The Gandhi government, 
however, was not in a position to confront the Court. Although it had 
a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha, it was preoccupied with the 
terrorism in Punjab that ultimately resulted in the tragedy of Indira 
Gandhi’s brutal assassination. 
D. Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi’s sudden death caused a great void in Indian 
politics. The Congress party was not in a position to produce a leader 
in her place. Her son Rajiv Gandhi was chosen unanimously because 
the Congress party wanted a charismatic leader from the same family. 
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In 1985 Rajiv Gandhi was elected with the maximum number of seats 
in the Lok Sabha. The Congress party, led by Rajiv Gandhi, reaped 
maximum advantage of sympathy created by the martyrdom of Indira 
Gandhi. 
The Rajiv Gandhi government, despite the overwhelming majority 
it gained in the Lok Sabha, was not very effective. The first act of 
statesmanship of the new Prime Minster was to strike a deal with the 
Akali Dal in Punjab and to let an Akali Dal government come to 
power in Punjab. This peace enabled it to enact legislation against 
floor-crossing by members of legislatures. The Constitution was 
amended in 1985 by the Fifty Second Amendment Act to include 
defection from a party on whose behalf a member was elected to the 
legislature, to another party as a basis for expulsion from the 
legislature. 
E. Independence of the Judiciary 
Legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on a shared perception 
that they are independent and non-political. By “non-political” we 
mean that the judges are not committed to any political party or any 
ideology canvassed by one or more of the political parties. The word 
“non-political” must be distinguished from the word “apolitical.” The 
view that judges must be apolitical contradicts views expressed by 
the judges themselves. Justice Patanjali Sastry said, as early as 1952, 
that while deciding the reasonableness of restrictions on fundamental 
rights, the social philosophy of a judge was bound to be reflected in 
his decisions.231 A judge cannot be “apolitical” because, like any 
other citizen, he is bound to have political preferences and ideologies. 
However, a judge can be non-political in the sense that his decisions 
are based not on considerations of power, but rather on principles. 
The phrase “being political” is understood in a pejorative sense as 
being shrewd enough to understand the mechanics of power and 
adjusting one’s decisions to considerations of acquiring power. A 
judge does not operate in this sense. A judge decides whether a 
persons’ fundamental right is violated without any regard to whether 
recognition of such a fundamental right would have deleterious 
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consequences for the power structure. However, the Court must make 
a political judgments about the scope of fundamental rights because 
ultimately it is also a judgment regarding the scope of the 
government’s power. Such political judgment of the Court is not, 
however, governed by the politics of the power structure. For 
example, when the Allahabad High Court held that Mrs. Gandhi had 
used corrupt practices in her election and that therefore it should be 
set aside,232 it was surely a political decision because it unseated a 
sitting prime minister—such a decision was political because it had 
political consequences. The judges did not make that decision 
because they wanted to unseat Mrs. Gandhi. However, what she did 
amounted to corrupt practices, as defined in the election laws, and 
therefore they held that her election was vitiated. Their social 
philosophy regarding how an election should be conducted might 
have influenced their decision. In this sense they were not apolitical. 
Yet they were non-political in the sense that they were impartial and 
objective. It is a political judgment as to when a court should 
intervene and when it should observe judicial restraint. 
A judge need not be apolitical, but he must be independent, 
fearless, and impartial. Independence means freedom from any 
influence whether political, socia l, or economic. Fearless means a 
judge should not fear the consequences of his decisions. A judge 
should be neither susceptible to temptation nor subjected to 
intimidation. To an extent, judges acquire these qualities as a result of 
their upbringing and education. But they must also be people of 
character and integrity. There are, however, external factors that may 
adversely affect the character or integrity of a judge. The Constitution 
provides for some positive provisions in this regard. The Constitution 
states that a judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the 
President after consultation with the Chief Justice and such other 
judges as he may see fit.233 A judge of a High Court shall be 
appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of 
India, the Governor of the state, and in case of a judge other than the 
Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court.234 A judge of the 
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Supreme Court shall serve until he attains the age of sixty-five years, 
and a judge of a High Court shall serve until he attains the age of 
sixty-two years. 
A judge may resign or may be removed by order of the President. 
A presidential order for the removal of a judge can be passed only 
after an address by Parliament, supported by a majority of the total 
membership of that House and by a majority of no less than two-
thirds of the members of that House present and voting, has been 
presented to the President in the same session for such removal on the 
ground of misbehavior or incapacity.235 Whereas the President may 
be removed by impeachment for “violation of the Constitution,” a 
judge is removable for “misbehavior and incapacity.” “Violation of 
the Constitution” is a more general expression and can include 
violations for causes other than misbehavior or incapacity. For 
example, a President who disregards the advice of the Council of 
Ministers could be impeached for violation of the Constitution. A 
judge is removable on more specific grounds, namely misbehavior or 
incapacity. Such misbehavior or incapacity must be assessed by a 
quasi-judicial body. Thus, removal of the President may proceed on 
political grounds whereas removal of a judge may proceed only on 
legal grounds. For example, a judge may not be removed because his 
interpretation of the Constitution is considered preposterous by 
members of Parliament. 
The question of whether a judge has misbehaved is to be assessed 
by a committee consisting of a judge of the Supreme Court of India, a 
Chief Justice of a High Court, and a jurist nominated by the 
Speaker.236 If the committee does not find any substance in the 
allegations, the matter is dropped. If, on the other hand, the 
committee reports against the judge, the matter is put before 
Parliament and removal ultimately depends on a majority of votes in 
each House of Parliament. This assessment of misbehavior or 
incapacity is a quasi-judicial process whereas the final act of removal 
is entirely a political process. The political process, however, does 
not operate unless and until the charge of misbehavior is found to be 
valid by the committee. 
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The Parliament determines the salaries of the Supreme Court and 
the High Courts judges. Schedule II of the Constitution specifies 
judges’ salaries,237 privileges, allowances, leaves of absence, and 
pensions.238 It has, however, been provided that neither the privileges 
nor the allowances of a judge, nor his rights in respect of leave of 
absence or pension, shall be varied to his disadvantage after this 
appointment.239 
It is significant that while the allowances, privileges, or rights of a 
judge cannot be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment, no 
such provision exists with respect to the salaries of judges. 
Parliament can lay down the salaries by law, but until it does so, they 
are as provided in the Constitution. Theoretically, Parliament can 
make law to reduce the salaries of the judges. Did the judges perceive 
such threat when they abdicated their authority in A.D.M. Jabalpur v. 
Shivakant Shukla? We have no evidence to say whether this was so, 
but such Parliamentary power could be dangerous to the 
independence of the judiciary. Today, the Court has become so 
politically strong, while Parliament has been diffused by coalitional 
alliances, that such a threat does not exist. Moreover, if Parliament 
ever tries to take such a sinister action, its act can be held invalid as 
being violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. 
Until 1982, it was supposed that the government’s discretion in 
appointing the judges was unfettered. The Law Commission had 
complained in its Fourteenth Report that appointments of judges 
occurred on partisan considerations.240 However, the matter became 
critical only after the three judges were superseded in 1973 and the 
government claimed the right to transfer the judges at will. We 
previously saw in this article how such power of the government was 
challenged before the Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta v. India.241 In that 
case, the Court imposed a constraint on the exercise of discretion by 
the government in so far as it was required to meaningfully consultate 
with the Chief Justice and other judges. The Court, however, left the 
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final power of appointment with the executive. In a later decision,242 
and more recently in an advice rendered on a reference by the 
President,243 the Court has now said that the final decision will be that 
of the Chief Justice, and a collegium of judges whose advice the 
President is bound to accept. This situation is unstable because a veto 
power in the hands of the Chief Justice and his collegium could be 
detrimental to the independence of the judiciary. A proposal to have a 
judicial selection commission for the appointment, transfer, and 
removal of judges has been under consideration for a long time. This 
will, however, require a constitutional amendment.244 
In view of the judicial activism, appointments to the Supreme 
Court and the High Courts should become more transparent. What 
are the criteria for such appointments? Formerly the judiciary was to 
play a mere technocratic role, and therefore such appointments were 
supposed to be based on professional competence only. However, in 
view of the facts that the Supreme Court has become the main censor 
of constitutional propriety and legality, has been required to decide 
questions with political ramifications like alleged violations of basic 
constitutional structure or the validity of the President’s exercise of 
power under Article 356, and has expanded the scope of justiciability 
under public interest litigation, thereby bringing within its purview 
matters that traditional jurisprudence considered non-justiciable, 
should the same criteria applicable to a technocratic judiciary be 
applicable to an activist judiciary? 
The traditional black letter law concept of independence of the 
judiciary was completely unrealistic. Recruitment to the apex court 
was never exclusively on the basis of merit. One reason is the 
difficulty in determining individual merit when equally qualified 
candidates exist. The composition of the Supreme Court is not 
entirely a matter of law, it is also a matter of politics. The apex Court 
of India is, of course, an Indian court and therefore must reflect the 
regional and ethnic composition of India. Care is taken to ensure that, 
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to the extent possible, all regions and minorities are represented in the 
Supreme Court—done by purposefully drawing in talent from 
different regions and different religious groups. Even gender ought to 
be considered. The size of the Supreme Court was seven judges, 
excluding the Chief Justice, in 1950 when the Court was established. 
The number of judges, excluding the Chief Justice, rose to ten in 
1956,245 thirteen in 1960,246 seventeen in 1977,247 and twenty-five in 
1986. 248 A cursory glance at the profiles of the judges reveals that out 
of the 136 judges appointed to the Court so far, thirteen have been 
Muslims, four Christians, two Sikhs, and two Parsis. Out of the 115 
judges who were Hindus, twenty-four have identified themselves as 
Brahmins.249 It is interesting that profiles of judges appointed in 
recent years do not reveal caste identities. Until now, only two 
judges—Vardarajan and K. Ramaswamy—have been appointed from 
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and only two women 
(Fatima Beevi and Sujata Manohar) have been appointed to the 
Court. The President of India, Dr. K.R. Narayanan, recently asked 
why more nominations of judges from the Scheduled Castes or 
Scheduled Tribes were not made. There was, as expected, a protest 
from the legal fraternity, and the Chief Justice reportedly commented 
that appointments to the Court would be made strictly on merit. 
Merit, in an unequal society, is a dubious concept. A constitutional 
court must be representative of all sections of society. We may not 
call it reservation, but some representatives from the most 
disadvantaged sections must be on the Court in order to make it a true 
national court. In the present Supreme Court, there are twenty-five 
judges, including the Chief Justice. Of these judges, two are Muslims, 
one is Parsi, and one is Christian. There is one female judge, but no 
judge from a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The legitimacy of 
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the Supreme Court depends upon the reflection of Indian pluralism in 
its composition. Women, as well as members of the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes, ought to be appointed to the Court in larger 
numbers. 
We must therefore know how judges are selected. What are the 
criteria for their selection? Should only professional competence be 
considered, or should consideration include such factors as a lawyers’ 
participation in legal aid, public interest litigation, or politics? Judges 
like Krishna Iyer, P.B. Sawant, and K.S. Hegde were active in 
politics before joining the judiciary, and produced judgments that 
were unbiased. In fact, all of the aforementioned stand out as 
examples of good judges. One of the reasons for the high legitimacy 
of the Supreme Court is that in the peoples’ mind, it is a body aloof 
from politics. The judges are not apolitical, but they must be capable 
of deciding matters before them in a politically dispassionate manner. 
Their past political experience may be an asset if they act impartially 
as judges. Public interest litigation in India, unlike in the United 
States, has been sustained with the active help of the lawyers. Should 
such lawyers not be preferred for judicial appointments? 
Another question that arises here is the question of ‘to whom are 
the judges accountable,’ How is such ‘accountability’ to be 
reinforced? Should there be scrutiny of the judgship nominations 
made by the President on the advice of the Chief Justice and his 
colleagues, or by a judicial service commission, by a House of 
Parliament? Should the age of retirement of the judges be raised? 
What should be done to remove a judge found with doubtful 
integrity? We have seen that the present provisions are inadequate in 
light of the fact that political parties do not take a well-reasoned 
stand. If a judge is of doubtful integrity, should he continue 
adjudicating given that his continuance would likely adversely affect 
the legitimacy of the Court? Although the Constitution bars judges 
from practicing as lawyers after retirement,250 we know that they 
work as arbitrators. How compatible with their independence is such 
post-retirement engagement of judges as arbitrators? Further, judges 
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are appointed to various bodies like the National Human Rights 
Commission or the National Commission under the Consumer 
Protection Act. How are such appointments made? Will a judge not 
compromise his independence by looking forward to such post-
retirement appointments by the Government? True, none of these 
events has occurred and even the complaints about lack of integrity 
on the part of the Supreme Court judges have been rare. However, 
from a long-term view of the legitimacy of the Court and its 
decisions, these concerns will have to be considered. A judicial 
service commission, independent of the government, should be given 
the exclusive power to appoint retired judges to various commissions 
or tribunals. 
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Judicial activism is not an aberration. It is an essential aspect of 
the dynamics of a constitutional court. It is a counter-majoritarian 
check on democracy. Judicial activism, however, does not mean 
governance by the judiciary. Judicial activism must also function 
within the limits of the judicial process. Within those limits, it 
performs the function of stigmatizing, as well as legitimizing, the 
actions of the other bodies of government—more often legitimizing 
than stigmatizing. The words remain the same, but they acquire new 
meaning as the experience of a nation unfolds and the Supreme Court 
gives continuity of life and expression to the open-textured 
expressions in the Constitution, to keep the Constitution abreast of 
the times. 
The judiciary is the weakest body of the state. It becomes strong 
only when people repose faith in it. Such faith constitutes the 
legitimacy of the Court and of judicial activism. Courts must 
continuously strive to sustain their legitimacy. Courts do not have to 
bow to public pressure, but rather they should stand firm against 
public pressure. What sustains legitimacy of judic ial activism is not 
its submission to populism, but its capacity to withstand such 
pressure without sacrificing impartiality and objectivity. Courts must 
not only be fair, they must appear to be fair. Such inarticulate and 
diffused consensus about the impartiality and integrity of the 
judiciary is the source of the Court’s legitimacy. 
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How is the Court’s legitimacy sustained? The myth created by the 
black letter law tradition, that judges do not make law but merely find 
it or interpret it, sought to immunize the judges from responsibility 
for their decisions. Mythologization of the judges also contributed to 
sustaining legitimacy. Those myths or devices are of no help in 
sustaining the legitimacy of judicial activism. We must expose 
certain myths. Similarly, we must de-mythologize the judiciary by 
declaring that a constitutional court is a political institution. It is 
political because it determines the limits of the powers of other 
bodies of government. Being political need not mean being partisan 
or unprincipled. The Court is political in much the same way as the 
President of India is political in his appointment of a Prime Minister 
or in the exercise of his discretion. 
Another de-mythologization is to admit that judges are human 
beings, and are as fallible as other human beings. If we have good 
judges, then we also have bad judges. Judges are sure to have their 
predilections and those predilections are bound to influence their 
judgments. 
The advantage of such de-mythologization is that people accept 
that judges, like other human beings, are not infallible. The courts 
themselves have imposed restraints on their own powers in order to 
minimize the chances of vagaries arising out of subjective lapses or 
prejudices of the judges. The courts are bound to follow previous 
precedents; they are bound to follow the decisions of the higher 
courts; and they are bound to follow certain rules of interpretation. 
Further, decisions of courts are reasoned and are often subject to 
appeal or review. These restrictions ensure that any lapse will be 
minimum. Critiquing the judgments of the courts would further act to 
correct objectionable judgments. Through such restrictions, the courts 
sustain their legitimacy. 
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